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I. INTRODUCTION

For too long, Younger v. Harris'-unexamined and taken for grantedhas served to keep bankruptcy's promised benefits tantalizingly out of the
reach of some debtors. By seriously limiting the circumstances under which
a federal court can enjoin state criminal proceedings, Younger has
effectively eliminated all of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. That

* Alumni Association Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The
author gratefully acknowledges support received from the Francis Lewis Law Center in the
preparation of this Article, and the research assistance of Leigh Anne Faugust, Class of 2009, and
Robert T. Eckstrom, Class of 2010.
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers
Collide-Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 117 (1990) ("Younger is
anything but dead .... ).
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alone is worthy of discussion and has attracted some attention, but none of
that attention has taken a bankruptcy focus, even though bankruptcy is one
of the eviscerated exceptions. Re-examination of Younger through a
bankruptcy lens is long overdue, and recent developments, although
seemingly unrelated to these questions, make a renewed discussion timely.
The need for a federal injunction against state criminal proceedings
arises when those proceedings serve a debt-collection purpose and, in
addition, involve a debt that is (or, under a proper construction of law, ought
to be) dischargeable. 2 This Article argues that Younger should not be an
impediment to such an injunction, given the uniqueness of bankruptcy and
the distinctions between it and the civil rights context from which Younger
evolved.
This Article will begin with the Anti-Injunction Act and its bankruptcy
exception. 3 This Article will then discuss Younger's judicially-created
abstention doctrine that all but repeals the statute's exceptions, as well as
the interpretation given Younger by Mitchum v. Foster,5 which was decided
the following year.6 While convincing arguments against Younger have
been made for decades, this Article's goal is more modest-to demonstrate
why the bankruptcy exception to the Anti-Injunction Act should be given its
full force, Younger (and Mitchum) to the contrary notwithstanding.
This Article will then review the Bankruptcy Code's injunction
provisions, demonstrating that, notwithstanding an exception to the
automatic stay, criminal proceedings rooted in statutes having a collection,
rather than penal, purpose are not immune from the reach of a bankruptcy
court injunction designed to protect a debtor's right to discharge.
Finally, this Article will demonstrate that certain restitutionary
obligations should be dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. To do
so, this Article will undertake the text-based analysis of the Code eschewed
by the Supreme Court when, undoubtedly misled by Younger, it held to the
contrary in Kelly v. Robinson.9

The scope of discharge is for Congress to determine and, to date,
Congress has been unreceptive to arguments that restitution ordered by a
state criminal court, pursuant to a collection-oriented criminal statute, should
be a dischargeable obligation.'o Concededly, the argument for discharge of

2. The best example of such a proceeding is a bad check prosecution because such statutes are
ubiquitous. However, other examples abound. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 11-22.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 23-60.

5. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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See infra text accompanying notes 61-85.
See infra text accompanying notes 86-174.
See infra text accompanying notes 175-215.
479 U.S. 36 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 216-325.
See infra text accompanying notes 217-21.
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such obligations is narrow, but an argument is available nonetheless. In any
event, its narrowness does not affect the point here-namely, that federalism
doctrines should not protect state efforts to determine the scope of a federal
bankruptcy discharge by criminalizing the failure to pay certain debts.
Congress determines the scope of discharge, through the vehicle of the
Bankruptcy Code.
II. ABSTENTION

A.

Anti-Injunction Act

The Anti-Injunction Act dates to 1793, when its predecessor was first
As originally worded, it flatly prohibited a federal court from
passed.
enjoining a state court proceeding. 2 There were no exceptions. Although
the meaning and intent of that provision have been the subject of some
discussion,13 and courts quickly crafted a number of judicial exceptions to
the statute's broad scope,14 it is the later legislative amendments that are
11. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333.
12. The statute, which was part of the Judiciary Act of 1793, provided in full:
And be it further enacted, That writs of ne exeat and of injunction may be granted by any
judge of the supreme court in cases where they might be granted by the supreme or a
circuit court; (a) but no writ of ne exeat shall be granted unless a suit in equity be
commenced, and satisfactory proof shall be made to the court or judge granting the same,
that the defendant designs quickly to depart from the United States; nor shall a writ of
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state; nor shall such writ be
granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his
attorney, of the time and place of moving for the same.
Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 334-35 (emphasis added).
13. The reasons for passage of the original provision "are not wholly clear." Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970). In the absence of any record of
debates surrounding the Judiciary Act of 1793, of which the Anti-Injunction Act was a part, the
Supreme Court in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), found it more
probable "that the provision reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity jurisdiction" than that
it "reflected the then strong feeling against the unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state
sovereignty." Id. at 131. Even so, the Toucey Court immediately cast the Anti-Injunction Act in
federalism terms:
[T]he purpose and direction underlying the provision are manifest from its terms:
proceedings in the state courts should be free from interference by federal injunction.
The provision expresses on its face the duty of "hands off' by the federal courts in the
use of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court.
Id. at 132. There has been no turning back.
14. The Supreme Court recounted this history in Mitchum v. Foster,407 U.S. 225 (1972), which
is discussed in text, infra, at notes 61-85. Because it had "recognized that exceptions must be made
to [the Anti-Injunction Act's] blanket prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts of
Congress were to be given their intended scope," the Court over the years found that at least six
federal laws, other than bankruptcy, have empowered federal courts to enjoin state proceedings.
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significant for bankruptcy purposes. For it was in the very first amendment,
enacted in 1874, that Congress expressly made bankruptcy an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.'5 The statute was amended again in 1948,16 at
which time it took its current form: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments."'
Bankruptcy is an "expressly authorized" exception to the AntiInjunction Act-a fact that has been accepted for well over 100 years, even
though bankruptcy is no longer expressly mentioned in the statute.' 8 The
legislative history accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
specifically states that § 105 is "an authorization, as required under 28
U.S.C. § 2283, for a court of the United States to stay the action of a State
court,"' 9 and courts at every level have recognized the exception both before
and after revision of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.20
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 234. These included, for example, "legislation providing for removal of' state
proceedings to federal court. Id. In addition, the Court recognized "implied" exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act's general prohibition of federal injunctions, including an "in rem" exception intended
to prevent interference by a state court with a federal court's jurisdiction over a res, and a
"relitigation" exception that enabled a federal court to prevent relitigation in state court of an issue
previously decided by a federal court. Id. at 235. A third exception permitted an injunction when
the federal plaintiff was the United States or "a federal agency asserting 'superior federal interests."'
Id. at 235-36. See also Toucey, 314 U.S. 118; Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute
Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 720 (1977) [hereinafter Redish, Anti-Injunction Statute].
15. The exception permitted an injunction "where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 136.
16. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968. This amendment came in response to the Court's
decision in Toucey, in which the Court cast "considerable doubt upon the approach to the antiinjunction statute reflected in its previous decisions." Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 236. Toucey "expressly
disavowed the 'relitigation' exception to the statute, and emphasized generally the importance of
recognizing the statute's basic directive 'of "hands off' by the federal courts in the use of the
injunction to stay litigation in a state court."' Id. (quoting Toucey, 314 U.S. at 132). Toucey
"threatened to destroy most of the judicial exceptions" by returning "to a literal interpretation" of the
statute's broad language. Note, FederalCourt Stays of State Court Proceedings:A Re-examination
of OriginalCongressionalIntent, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 612, 612 (1971). According to the Reviser's
notes for 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the purpose of the amendment was both to overrule Toucey and to
restore a pre-Toucey understanding of the law: "[T]he revised section restores the basic law as
generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." Reviser's Notes, H.R. Rep. No.
308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., A181-182 (1947).
17. 28 U.S.C § 2283 (2006) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat.
869, 968).
18. Brown v. Shriver (In re Brown), 39 B.R. 820, 826 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) ("Though the
specific reference to bankruptcy has been removed from the anti-injunction statute, it is well
recognized that the 'expressly authorized' exception in § 2283 includes injunctions authorized under
the bankruptcy laws.").
19. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 317 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6274; S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 29 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815.
20. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 app. at 512 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting)
(listing bankruptcy among seven statutes recognized as exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act); Davis
v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that bankruptcy is an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act); U.S. Home Corp. v. Los Prados Cmty. Ass'n (In re
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If that were not enough, bankruptcy could very easily fall within either
of the other statutory exceptions as well. Surely, if a state court is
attempting to take action inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's dictates,
then one could characterize a federal injunction as "necessary in aid of [the
federal court's] jurisdiction." 21 Or, if a bankruptcy court has issued an
order-such as a discharge or a plan confirmation-then later inconsistent
action by a state court could be enjoined by the federal court "acting to
protect or effectuate its judgments."2 2 Of course, one exception, alone,
should be as efficacious as all three. The point is merely to emphasize that
bankruptcy court injunctions are, in every respect, completely consistent
with the Anti-Injunction Act's exceptions.
B. Younger v. Harris
Under ordinary principles of statutory construction, the Anti-Injunction
Act's prohibition against injunctions in the absence of an exception should
carry a negative inference-that an injunction is appropriate when one of the
statutory exceptions applies. That is hardly the case, however, given the
23
Supreme Court's monumental decision in Younger v. Harris.
In Younger,
a defendant being prosecuted in state court for violating the state's Criminal
Syndicalism Act sought a federal injunction on the grounds that the state
statute unconstitutionally infringed upon his rights to free speech. Although
a three-judge court granted the injunction, the Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that the injunction violated "the national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under
special circumstances." 24 The Court referred to the Anti-Injunction Act as
the expression of Congress's long-standing "desire to permit state courts to
try state cases free from interference by federal courts," 25 and recited some
of the Anti-Injunction Act's history as a justification for federal court
abstention. The Court, however, did not rely directly on the Anti-Injunction
Act in reaching its decision.26 Rather, the Court found that the
U.S.H. Corp. of NY), 280 B.R. 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that an injunction issued to
effectuate a plan confirmation order is an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
22. Id.
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger's companion cases were Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis,401 U.S. 216 (1971).
24. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Justice Stewart, in concurring, acknowledged this much more expressly than did the
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noninterference policy derives from two sources- first, equity, and second,
comity, which the Court labeled "Our Federalism" "for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it." 27
The first source--equity-is based on the doctrine that "courts of equity
should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will
not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."28 Equity was hardly
the crux of Younger's analysis, 29 however, and equity has, in fact, receded as
a rationale for federal court abstention.30
The second source-comity, or "Our Federalism" '-was the "more
vital" 3 2 of the two. It is based, in the Court's view, upon
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.33
majority: "In basing its decisions on policy grounds, the Court does not reach any questions
concerning the independent force of the federal anti-injunction statute ..... Id. at 55 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Professor Fiss, however, has described the Court's rationale of "Our Federalism" as
derived from the Anti-Injunction Act. Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1118
(1977).
The Court did state that it had "no occasion" to decide whether the Anti-Injunction Act
"would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case." Younger, 401 U.S. at
54. That statement, however, has been read as the Court's refusal to consider whether § 1983 is an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act-a different question than whether the Anti-Injunction Act
could have provided the grounds for a decision in the case presented, in the absence of any
exception.
27. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. According to Professor Fiss, the majority in Younger "did not
analyze, rigorously or otherwise, the underlying tenets of federalism." Fiss, supra note 26, at 1118.
Rather, the Court "merely gave us a new shibboleth." Id.
28. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
29. Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate Foundations of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 10 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 311, 321 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State
Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 224; Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 86
(1984) [hereinafter Redish, Abstention].
30. Brown, supra note 1; Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory ofAbstention, 88 MICH. L. REV.
530, 536 n.24, 556 n.118 (1989); Martin H. Redish, The DoctrineofYounger v. Harris: Deference in
Search ofa Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 464 n.6 (1978) [hereinafter Redish, Doctrine of
Younger].
31. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Although comity and federalism may, in fact, be distinct concepts,
Laycock, supra note 29, at 224, the Court treated them so similarly, and they bear so strong a
resemblance, that no distinction need be drawn for present purposes.
32. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
33. Id. This respect runs both ways, of course, requiring "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments." Id. Despite the Court's call for balance, however, nothing
of the sort has been achieved by Younger and its progeny. Ann Haberfelde, Note, A Reexamination
of the Non-Dischargeabilityof Criminal Restitutive Obligations in Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1517, 1561 (1992); Redish, DoctrineofYounger, supranote 30, at 487-88.
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Thus, the Court held "that a federal court must not, save in exceptional and
extremely limited circumstances, intervene by way of either injunction or
declaration in an existing state criminal prosecution." 34
Younger also expressed several policy considerations." One is a fairly
straightforward forum allocation preference, either as a preference for relief
in the criminal forum in which parties already find themselves, or as a
preference for relief in a state forum able to decide issues that can properly
be raised there.
A second consideration underlying Younger was the Court's concern
that federal courts should not impugn the competence of state courts.
Younger stressed the availability of a state forum in which the defendant's
constitutional challenge could be presented.
Thus, removal of the issue
from state court by means of a federal injunction would imply either
incompetence or a lack of confidence in the state courts.3 9 Either would
constitute an affront.4 0
34. Younger, 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. See generally Redish, DoctrineofYounger, supra note 30, at 465-66.
36. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1281-85
(1977).

37. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 87 ("Younger rests largely on the desire to avoid
insulting state judiciaries by questioning their competence or good faith."); id. at 91 ("The social
policy harms thought to be avoided by Younger abstention include the fear that state judges will be
insulted by the doubts raised about their competence to enforce federal rights."); Redish, Doctrine of
Younger, supra note 30, at 465-66 (citing, as first among the Court's "four conceivable bases for
limiting the injunctive powers of federal courts" in Younger, "the desire to avoid slighting state
courts by questioning their competence or willingness to enforce federal constitutional rights . . . .");
see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (noting that in Younger, the Court was
"cognizant that a pending state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide the federal
plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for vindicating his constitutional rights, and, in that
circumstance, the restraining of an ongoing prosecution would entail an unseemly failure to give
effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts
'to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the [C]onstitution of the United
States... .' (quoting Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624, 637 (1884))).
38. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 107.
39. Redish, Doctrine ofYounger, supranote 30, at 465-66.
40. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 36, at 1289-90 n.98
("The notion of affront contains a built-in normative component-it depends on the removal from a
state court of an issue that would normally be tried in that court under circumstances that suggest the
removal is motivated by a lack of confidence."); Daniel Jordan Simon, Comment, Abstention
Preemption: How the Federal Courts Have Opened the Door to the Eradication of "Our
Federalism," 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355, 1367 (2005) ("(A]ny suggestion that state courts are
inadequate adjudicators of federal questions of any kind has been soundly rejected by the Supreme
Court in the strongest terms. Indeed, the very existence of Younger flies in the face of such a stance
because it defers to state courts to rule on constitutional issues and endorses their ability to do so at
the exclusion of the federal court system." (footnotes omitted)).
A good bit of ink has been spilled addressing the question whether Younger's confidence in
the competence of state courts was well-placed, especially in the civil rights context. See Redish,

7

In Younger, the Court also sought to avoid needless friction between the
state and federal systems,41 especially when important state interests (such as
enforcement of its criminal laws) are involved. 42 This policy can be further
refined into two more specific subparts, one substantive and the other
procedural: a desire to avoid federal interference with a state's enforcement
of its substantive policies; and a desire to avoid disruption of a state's
judicial processes.43 These subparts are interrelated and, in fact, the desire to
avoid needless friction may subsume and summarize the other primary
policy underlying Younger," because "friction" may be generated by a
federal affront to the competency of a state court.4 5 The fact that the policies
Doctrine of Younger, supra note 30, at 483 ("Harsh reality may justify doubts about the competence
of state courts in enforcing federal rights."). Cf Laycock, supra note 29, at 234 ("The large volume
of Younger litigation gives rise to its own inferences: with so many prosecutors fighting to stay in
state court and so many defense lawyers fighting to get into federal court, one must wonder if they
are all wrong about where their clients' interests lie."). See generally Burt Neubome, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (criticizing the assumption that state and federal courts are
equally competent forums for addressing federal constitutional rights).
41.
[U]nless there is nothing to the federalism and comity arguments advanced by the Court
in favor of abstention, sweeping all cases falling under the head of federal jurisdiction
into federal court may threaten interests essential to the smooth operation of a
government organized around dual sovereigns with coordinate court systems. There is
bound to be serious friction in a dual court system where the federal courts while
mouthing platitudes about coequal responsibility-nonetheless consistently trump efforts
of the state courts.
Friedman, supranote 30, at 548-49 (footnote omitted).
42. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982)
(holding that Younger's doctrine of federal abstention is particularly applicable when important state
interests are involved).
43. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 91; Redish, DoctrineofYounger, supra note 30, at 466.
Later cases, particularly Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), reveal how low the
threshold is for what qualifies as an important state interest. In that case, which involved litigation
between two private parties (both well-represented and powerful corporations), the mere existence of
a state proceeding seems to have been enough:
[Tihis case involvels] challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance
with the judgments of its courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases
interfere with the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that
challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained. So long as those
challenges relate to pending state proceedings, proper respect for the ability of state
courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the
federal court stay its hand.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
44. The policies are undoubtedly overlapping. See, e.g., David Mason, Note, Slogan or
Substance? Understanding "Our Federalism" and Younger Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 852,
868 (1988) ("'[U]nduly interfere' simply restates the inadequacy prerequisite."); Simon, supra note
40, at 1364 (suggesting that Younger's exception for bad faith prosecutions is sufficient to cover
prosecutions under statutes that are "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional "in every clause,
sentence and paragraph.").
45. See Robert B. Funkhouser et. al., Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on
the Limits ofFederalCourt Power over State Court Proceedings, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 767, 811-12
(1986) (suggesting that the fundamental policy underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Younger
was the desire to avoid "federal-state friction" that emerges when federal courts interfere with state
court proceedings under the assumption that state courts are incompetent to adjudicate certain

8
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underlying Younger are somewhat contradictory4 6 need not detain us.
Younger was not without exceptions. After noting the three statutory
exceptions found in the Anti-Injunction Act,47 the Court recognized that "a
judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced by the statute has
been made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can show
that he will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer
irreparable damages. 48 After reviewing earlier cases, however, the Court
concluded that "even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is 'both great
and immediate."' 4 9 As if that limitation were not enough, the Court added
that "the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered
'irreparable."'" 0 This assertion was premised on the assumption that the
criminal proceeding was brought lawfully and in good faith, so a prosecution
brought in bad faith or to harass the defendant could be described either as
the other side of that coin or as another exception to Younger.5 1 Finally, the
Court admitted that the requisite irreparable injury might be established, in
the absence of bad faith and harassment, if the statute at issue is "flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an
52
effort might be made to apply it."
claims).
46. See Redish, Doctrineof Younger, supra note 30, at 473-74 (noting that Younger's exceptions
for bad faith prosecutions and prosecutions under flagrantly unconstitutional statutes are inconsistent
with a desire to avoid affronting state courts). The inconsistencies mount when other Supreme Court
decisions are taken into account. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 30, at 540 ("A key ingredient in the
Younger cases is the Court's presumption that state courts are sufficient to protect federal civil rights
.... Never mind that precisely the opposite presumption justified Monroe [v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)1's expansion of federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases in the first place.").
47. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). These exceptions were of no particular
relevance, apparently, given that the Court did not rely on the Anti-Injunction Act.
48. Id. at 43.
49. Id. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
50. Id. The assumption is that such a defendant has an adequate remedy at law, thus negating
one of the fundamental requirements for equitable relief, and simultaneously rendering the "friction"
of a federal injunction "needless."
51. That was the factual box into which the Supreme Court in Younger placed its earlier decision
in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Court had permitted an injunction to
issue. Younger, 401 U.S. at 47-48. The Court in Younger expressly disavowed any statements in
Dombrowski that could be read to permit equitable relief, in the absence of bad faith or harassment,
whenever the state criminal statute is facially unconstitutional. Id. at 50.
52. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). This
exception has provided the analytical foundation for a so-called "preemption exception." See
Simon, supra note 40, at 1366 (describing the origins of the preemption exception to Younger). This
exception is built on the proposition that states have "no interest in creating or enforcing laws where
the federal government has preempted the area of law." Id. at 1368. This exception, which has
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Those exceptions are designed to capture the sorts of unusual
circumstances in which a federal injunction can appropriately be issued
against a state proceeding. Although this concept can be expressed in
various ways, the Supreme Court said in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n 53 that Younger "and its progeny
espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with
pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." 54
Because Younger's exceptions are rarely satisfied, "Younger abstention
is all but total.""5 In effect, Younger slammed the door on federal
injunctions of state criminal proceedings, and did so without addressing the
proper role of the Anti-Injunction Act. More specifically, the Court did not
address whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.57 By assuming that § 1983 is not such an exception,
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court, is arguably inconsistent with Younger's holding that
federal remedies are unavailable to state defendants subjected to prosecution under unconstitutional
statutes, id. at 1373, and with Younger's underlying rationale of parity between state and federal
courts, id. at 1376-77.
53. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
54. Id.at431.
55. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 88; see also Fiss, supra note 26, at 1135 (concluding
that Younger and its progeny have essentially vested complete power to select the forum for
litigation of constitutional questions in the state district attorneys). The exception for a statute
unconstitutional "in every clause, sentence and paragraph" has been described as "practically
useless," since a prosecution premised on such a statute would surely carry no reasonable likelihood
of success and, therefore, would fall under the bad faith exception. Simon, supra note 40, at 1364.
In addition, Professor Laycock opined that this exception "has become meaningless" in the wake of
Trainorv. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). Laycock, supra note 29, at 198.
56. Younger has, of course, been expanded into both civil and administrative contexts, and to
cases in which a state is not even a party. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)
(applying Younger although a state was not a party to the action); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (administrative proceedings); Middlesex, 457 U.S.
at 423 (civil proceedings). Note, however, Justice Stewart's admonition in Younger that the Court
was not dealing "with the considerations that should govern a federal court when it is asked to
intervene in state civil proceedings, where, for various reasons, the balance might be struck
differently." Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring). Apparently, the Court has paid no
mind.
This expansion has been the subject of critical commentary. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The
Misguided Searchfor State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil
v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1090 (1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has simply lost track of the
original purpose behind the Younger abstention doctrine."); Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger
Civil: The Consequences of FederalCourt Deference to State Court Proceedings-A Response to
ProfessorStravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173, 176 (1989) ("The ease and complacency with which
the Supreme Court extended the Younger abstention doctrine in a civil context [in Pennzoil],
however, is very disturbing."). But see Ruggero J. Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L.
REV. 181, 217 (1979) ("From a doctrinal point of view, I find it difficult to distinguish persuasively
The concerns of federalism that support federal
between civil and criminal proceedings.
noninterference in criminal cases are also relevant in civil cases.").
57. The Court expressly declined to decide this question, but did so without actual mention of

§ 1983:
Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable
principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether 28
U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings "except as
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the Court could simply have found the otherwise-absolute language of the
Anti-Injunction Act controlling. Instead, the Court used the Act solely as a
source for the policies of noninterference,5 9 upon which it constructed a
judicial standard for determining the appropriateness of an injunction.W
C. Mitchum v. Foster
A year later, in Mitchum v. Foster,6 1 the Court finally resolved the
question it had ducked in Younger and held that § 1983 is an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act6-a monumental holding in
the civil rights field. Although its relevance for bankruptcy was not
immediately apparent, Mitchum is central to the present undertaking because
the opinion addressed both Younger and the Act, and provided a glimpsehowever incomplete and problematic-into the relationship between the
two. Consideration of both cases, therefore, reveals the theoretical
difficulties of the Court's federalism jurisprudence-difficulties that appear
in the bankruptcy context as well.
Mitchum began by reiterating the Court's rejection, in Atlantic Coast

expressly authorized by Act of Congress" would in and of itself be controlling under the
circumstances of this case.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. Justice Stewart, again, was more forthcoming: "[W]e do not decide
whether the word 'injunction' in § 2283 should be interpreted to include a declaratory judgment, or
whether an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court is 'expressly authorized' by . .. § 1983."
Id. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring). The majority's refusal to decide that question was the basis, in
part, for Justice Douglas's dissent in Younger: "I hold to the view that § 1983 is included in the
'expressly authorized' exception to § 2283." Id. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. As Professor Maraist noted, "federal courts refrain from enjoining pending state court
proceedings not because Congress in the Anti-Injunction Act has denied them jurisdiction to do so,
but because the judicial doctrine of comity compels them not to do so." Frank L. Maraist, Federal
Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L.
REv. 535, 542 (1970).
59. See Fiss, supra note 26, at 1128 ("Younger ... focused exclusively on § 2283 as a policy
oracle. . . .").
60. It may be true that "[in Younger itself . . . the Court has shown its conviction that the
statutory safeguards to federalism provided by Congress are insufficient," Simon, supra note 40, at
1377, but that does not address the source of the Court's authority to arrogate that power unto itself.
The Court's audacity seems even greater upon consideration of an observation made by
Professor Eisenberg in a commentary on Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972): "Recent
scholarship, which implicitly supports Mitchum, suggests that the original 1793 version of the antiinjunction statute sought merely to prohibit individual Supreme Court Justices from enjoining state
proceedings and was not intended to be a comprehensive ban on federal injunctions against state
proceedings." Theodore Eisenberg, Mitchum v. Foster, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1750 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2nd ed.2000).
61. Mitchum, 407 U.S. 225.
62. Id. at 243.
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Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,63 of the

argument that the Anti-Injunction Act "merely states a flexible doctrine of
comity"" that would permit issuance of an injunction even in circumstances
not covered by an exception. Rather, according to the Mitchum Court, the
statute absolutely bars issuance of a federal injunction against a pending
state proceeding "in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions."
Mitchum reviewed previously established exceptions to the AntiInjunction Act 66 and concluded that § 1983 is among those "expressly
authorized."67 The Court's rationale rested on the "vast transformation from
the concepts of federalism" 68 prevailing at the time the Anti-Injunction Act
was passed, brought about by the era of Reconstruction. "The very purpose
of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial.'" 69
Mitchum, therefore, was premised on the very suspicion of state courts
that Younger disclaimed,70 yet, the Mitchum Court asserted its adherence to
Younger:

In so concluding, we do not question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal
court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding. These principles,
in the context of state criminal prosecutions, were canvassed at length
last Term in Younger v. Harris, and its companion cases. They are
principles that have been emphasized by this Court many times in the
past. Today we decide only that the District Court in this case was in
error in holding that, because of the anti-injunction statute, it was
absolutely without power in this § 1983 action to enjoin a proceeding
pending in a state court under any circumstances whatsoever.

63. 398 U.S. 281(1970).
64. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 228.
65. Id. at 229. This suggests the Court's respect for the Anti-Injunction Act's wording when no
exception is present. Interestingly, the Court does not seem to show a similar respect when one is.
See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
66. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
67. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. Professor Redish virtually mocked this result: "In what may be
one of the most bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analysis, the Court in Mitchum found section
1983 to be an 'implied' express exception (an oxymoron if ever there was one) . . . ." Redish,
Abstention, supra note 29, at 87; see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 599 n.307 (describing
Mitchum as a case "in which the Court perverted legislative intent and strained any reasonable
interpretation of the English language").
68. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
69. Id. (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243 (citations omitted).
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This language intimates that Younger remains an obstacle for a party seeking
issuance of a federal injunction, even when an exception to the AntiInjunction Act is involved.72 But the Court seemed not to notice the
analytical difficulty of this position-if an exception to the statute is present,
how can the Court effectively slam the door on issuance of the requested
injunction, as Younger did, by adding such stringent judicial limitations on
the legislative language that the statutory exception is effectively negated?73
That approach, in effect, uses a judicially crafted doctrine to eviscerate an
act of Congress.
This analytical problem is compounded by language in Mitchum
addressing the relationship between Younger and the Anti-Injunction Act:
[I]f § 1983 is not within the statutory exception, then the antiinjunction statute would have absolutely barred the injunction
issued in Younger ... and there would have been no occasion
whatever for the Court to decide that case upon the "policy" ground
of "Our Federalism." Secondly, if § 1983 is not within the
"expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, then
we must overrule Younger and its companion cases insofar as they
recognized the permissibility of injunctive relief against pending
criminal prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional
circumstances. For, under the doctrine of Atlantic Coast Line, the
anti-injunction statute would, in a § 1983 case, then be an "absolute
prohibition" against federal equity intervention in a pending state
criminal or civil proceeding-under any circumstances whatever.74
The Court seemed, by these observations, to recognize the superior position
of the Anti-Injunction Act: the statute would have provided the (negative)
answer to the question of whether an injunction could properly issue if §
1983 had not been an exception; and, if no exception had been at play, the
Court could not have permitted even the limited non-statutory exceptions
noted in Younger. The Court said that if § 1983 were not an exception to the
72. That conclusion is bolstered by the Court's remand "for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion." Id. at 243. Although the exact issues to be considered on remand were not specified
(as is not unusual) reversal of the lower court's denial of an injunction, on the grounds of
disagreement with the lower court's conclusion that the Anti-Injunction Act barred an injunction,
leaves open the question whether equity's requirements for an injunction were satisfied. On remand,
Younger might have been expected to present a formidable bar to an affirmative answer.
73. Professor Redish found it "inconceivable that Congress would vest in the federal judiciary
total discretion to overrule the product of the congressional balancing process." Redish, Abstention,
supra note 29, at 88. Without further refinement, however, that is exactly where Younger has left us.
74. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 231.
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Anti-Injunction Act, then the Act would have presented an absolute bar to an
injunction and Younger could not properly have permitted issuance of an
injunction in "certain limited and exceptional circumstances." 75 If the Act is
completely determinative when no exception is present, however, should it
not also be determinative when one is?76 If an injunction may not issue in
the absence of an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, then why is there
not a negative pregnant-specifically, that an injunction may issue when an
exception is applicable?
This difficulty, unsurprisingly, has not gone unnoticed by commentators
in the decades since Younger and Mitchum were decided. The relationship
between the two cases is decidedly problematic-it was described by
Professor Brown as "muddied at best." 8 Yet, the solution he proposed does
leave Younger as a hurdle to be surmounted even when an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act is present: "The best way to harmonize the two is that
Mitchum leaves intact the federal courts' authority to engage in federalistic
abstention even though Congress wants it to hear the equitable action as an
initial matter."79
That proposed solution (if such it was) leads directly to Professor
Redish's attack against Younger on separation-of-powers grounds.80 As he
75. Id.
76. Cf Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 88 ("[I]f Mitchum is valid, Younger abstention
represents an effective reversal of the congressional decision to make section 1983 an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.").
77. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 231.
78. Brown, supra note 1, at 146. Professor Brown, however, was aware of the difficulties posed
by Younger's failure to adopt a statutory approach: "Whatever the source [of law applied in
Younger], the Court has not been forthright in discussing its authority to utilize that source, given the
possibility that statutes address the matter directly." Id. at 120.
Another commentator, describing the relationship between the two cases as "curious," noted
the question without proposing a solution: "[O]ne might well ask why, if § 1983 qualifies as an
express exception from the letter of the statute, it does not also qualify as an exception to judgemade rules derived from the statute. The question is not addressed by the Court." Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism,supra note 36, at 1288 n.88.
79. Brown, supra note 1, at 146. Professor Bartels also noted this difficulty and proposed a
similar solution, as the only way to square the results in Younger and Mitchum. Robert Bartels,
Avoiding a Comity of Errors:A Model for Adjudicating FederalCivil Rights Suits that "Interfere"
with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 27, 49 (1976).
80. See generally Redish, Abstention, supra note 29. In the process, Professor Redish noted the
inconsistencies between Younger and Mitchum:
In Younger, the Court found the injunction improper, purely as a matter of judge-made
principles. It expressly declined to consider whether the injunction was barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act. One year later in Mitchum v. Foster, the Court, in a highly
questionable opinion, found that section 1983 constituted an implied yet "expressly
authorized" congressional exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. It nevertheless continued
to adhere to the terms of Younger's judge-made abstention doctrine. In what may be one
of the most bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analysis, the Court in Mitchum found
section 1983 to be an "implied" express exception (an oxymoron if ever there was one)
because of the grave mistrust of the state judiciaries expressed by the drafters of the
statute. Yet Younger rests largely on the desire to avoid insulting state judiciaries by
questioning their competence or good faith.
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argued, "neither total nor partial judge-made abstention is acceptable as a
matter of legal process and separation of powers..

. ."

Rather,

"Congress ... has established a network of federally protected substantive
rights and simultaneously vested the federal courts with jurisdiction to
enforce those laws, and the Supreme Court lacks the authority to ignore or
invalidate those statutes merely because of disagreement with their
substance."82
Of course, Professor Redish's argument, Younger, and Mitchum all
arose out of the same context-constitutionally protected civil rights,
including rights of free speech. (Although the majority in Younger neither
mentioned the words "civil rights" nor referred to § 1983-that was left to
the concurring83 and dissenting 84 opinions-the civil rights context was

Id. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted). Professor Redish made the point even more directly in an earlier
article:
[T]he greatest enigma in light of the Mitchum reasoning is the continued vitality-indeed,
expansion-of the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Although the Younger doctrine
assumes that section 2283 is no bar to issuance of a federal injunction in section 1983
suits, it nevertheless provides that as a matter of purely judge-made policy a federal court
usually should not restrain a state prosecution, even to vindicate constitutional rights.
The Younger doctrine assumes that an individual's federal constitutional rights can be
adequately vindicated by raising them as defenses in the course of state prosecutions.
Yet, if we are to believe the legislative history as detailed in Mitchum, the driving force
behind the adoption of the Civil Rights Act was the conviction that state courts are unable
to perform effectively the very function Younger assumes they can and do perform
continuously. It is therefore difficult to see how Mitchum and Younger can coexist,
although the seeming inconsistency appears not to have troubled the Court.
Redish, Anti-Injunction Statute, supra note 14, at 737-38 (footnotes omitted).
81. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 74; cf Bartels, supra note 79, at 32 n.18 ("[It may be
that the Supreme Court's discretion is not properly exercised when it effectively removes from the
federal courts cases over which they clearly have been given jurisdiction.").
82. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 77. In the face of that argument, going to the structure
of our fundamental institutions, it is insufficient simply to observe that "[iun Younger itself, as with
other abstention doctrines created by the Court, the Court has shown its conviction that the statutory
safeguards to federalism provided by Congress are insufficient." Simon, supra note 40, at 1377.
The problem is to ascertain what gives the Court the right.
83. Justice Stewart did so in the process of noting what the Court did not decide:
In basing its decisions on policy grounds, the Court does . .. not decide whether the word
"injunction" in § 2283 should be interpreted to include a declaratory judgment, or
whether an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court is "expressly authorized" by § I
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). The other concurring opinion,
by Justice Brennan, made no mention of either. Id. at 56-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. As the Court observed in Mitchum, Justice Douglas was the only member of the Court in
Younger who took a position on the question whether. § 1983 was an "expressly authorized"
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 226-27 n.4 (1972).
Obviously, in the course of doing so he mentioned both civil rights and § 1983 repeatedly, putting
particular emphasis on the latter. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 59-65.

15

nevertheless unmistakable.85 ) That context was of particular relevance in
Mitchum because of the Court's reliance on the history and purposes of the
civil rights legislation that provided the basis for the defendant's claim to
federal relief. Congress had given those matters to the protection of the
federal courts; thus, the Anti-Injunction Act imposed no bar.
D. Younger and Mitchum in Bankruptcy

The analytical problems with Younger, and the compelling criticisms
leveled against it, have not deterred subsequent courts from applying it even
when an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is involved.86 And, if Younger
is thought to be applicable, the only alternative available to a litigant trying
to obtain a federal injunction (and to the court willing to issue one) is a
struggle to fit within one of Younger's exceptions.87 These efforts have been
met with mixed results in bankruptcy cases.
Non-bankruptcy cases have also relied on Younger's exceptions in
finding abstention inappropriate.
One of those cases, Richmond,
85. Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 85; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism,supra note 36, at 1281-83.
86. For example, several cases relied on Younger as authority for their holdings that bankruptcy
injunctions should not issue against state criminal prosecutions for various sorts of financial crimes.
See Fussell v. Price (In re Fussell), 928 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1991); Davis v. Sheldon (In re
Davis), 691 F.2d 176, 178 (3rd Cir. 1982); Barnette v. Evans (In re Barnette), 673 F.2d 1250, 125152 (11th Cir. 1982); cf Mason, supra note 44, at 856-57 ("The Younger doctrine comes into play
when a federal plaintiff brings an action under one of these express exceptions [to the AntiInjunction Act].").
87. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. Another alternative is to ignore Younger, of
course, although that may not be the most satisfactory solution analytically. See, e.g., In re Lake, 11
B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (issuing an injunction upon determining that the criminal
proceeding had been brought for the purpose of collecting a debt, with no mention whatsoever of
Younger).
88. Debtors have experienced some success at the bankruptcy and district court levels, but any
lower-court success evaporates once a case gets to the Courts of Appeal. In In re Simonini, 282 B.R.
604 (W.D.N.C. 2002), for example, the district court engaged in a careful analysis of Younger's
exception for patently unconstitutional statutes, and concluded that a "prosecution eviscerates the
express purpose of the Bankruptcy Code by abusing the protection afforded by Younger when it
collects debt for profit in the name of a criminal action." Id. at 614. On appeal, the circuit court
reversed with little more than a citation to Younger. Simonini v. Bell (In re Simonini), 69 F. App'x
169, 171 (4th Cir. 2003).
Other appellate decisions have at least provided some analysis before refusing to grant an
injunction. For example, in Barnette, the court found that the debtor was not facing the sort of grave
injury Younger requires when he obtained an injunction from the bankruptcy court, prohibiting the
prosecutor and creditor-witness from continuing a prosecution for theft by deception, as soon as a
grand jury indictment was issued:
There had been no criminal conviction and no discharge of the debt. The bankruptcy
court reasoned that an injunction was necessary to protect the integrity of its proceedings
since if there were a criminal conviction the mandatory restitution sentence would
conflict with the discharge order ifthe debt created by the theft were discharged. As the
appellant's brief described the rationale: if we had some ham, we could have ham and
eggs, if we had some eggs.
Barnette, 673 F.2d at 1252.
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Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Forst,89 provides a striking

parallel to the bankruptcy context. In Forst, the court was presented with a
long-running dispute between a railroad and state taxing authorities.90 In
particular, the court was confronted with the Tax Injunction Act, 91 which
bars federal courts from interfering with state tax processes when a state
remedy is available, and with section 306 of the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act, 92 which prohibits state tax assessments inconsistent
with a designated ratio and includes an explicit exception to the Tax
Injunction Act. 93 The Forstdistrict court held, inter alia, that abstention was
required by Younger, but the Fourth Circuit reversed that holding: "Because
Congress created in § 306 a clear exception to the principles of comity that
underlie Younger abstention, we believe this case presents just such
extraordinary circumstances."94 The court recognized Congress's "profound
respect for the integrity of state sovereignty in taxation matters." 95
Abstention, nevertheless, was inappropriate:
In the narrow context of state taxation of railroad property,
Congress has determined that the principles of comity that underlie
the Tax Injunction Act-the principles that also underlie Younger
abstention-simply do not apply. Section 306 defines an entire
category of cases in which "extraordinary circumstances" exist to
justify federal court intervention in state taxation matters.
Consequently, the district court abused its discretion by abstaining
under Younger.96
The parallel between Forst and bankruptcy cases is clear. Just as
section 306 was an exception to the Tax Injunction Act, bankruptcy is an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Congress's respect for state integrity
in criminal matters is no less profound than in tax matters. For that reason,
bankruptcy bows to state criminal matters when they are truly at issue.
Bankruptcy does not, however, bow to collection matters; they present
another "clear exception to the principles of comity that underlie Younger

89. 4 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 246.

91. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
92. 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1976), amended by ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88,
§ 102(a), 109 Stat. 844.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Forst, 4 F.3d at 245, 247.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id.
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abstention" 7 and constitute "extraordinary circumstances" within both
Middlesex and Forst.

Forst is unsatisfactory in another respect, however. By finding that the
statutory exception in the Tax Injunction Act constituted "extraordinary
circumstances" within Younger, Forst effectively collapsed Younger's
analysis into a statutory question-if an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
applies, then an exception to Younger is automatically found. Younger has
no independent force. Yet we know that Mitchum did "not question or
qualify in any way" the federalism principles on which Younger was
based. 8 If Younger is to remain a separate hurdle for a state defendant, then
something more than a statutory exception is needed before "extraordinary
circumstances" arise.
Forst and the other cases that struggle with Younger's exceptions prove
the need for a better approach. One is available. It begins with an
acknowledgement that Younger's policy justifications are as inapt in a
bankruptcy context as critiques of Younger are well taken. There are
compelling distinctions between Younger and bankruptcy cases, and when
the policy underpinnings of Younger (as elaborated and clarified in
Mitchum") are applied in the context of bankruptcy, it rapidly becomes
evident that Younger should not be transplanted wholesale from the civil
rights context into this very different world. The policy considerations
simply do not have the same resonance.
Younger rested, in part, on the fact that the state defendant in that case
had an opportunity to present his constitutional arguments as a defense to the
criminal charges. 00 That opportunity was a foundational consideration in
the Supreme Court's refusal to permit issuance of a federal injunction. A
state criminal proceeding being used primarily as a collection device,
however, will not afford the debtor-defendant an equivalent opportunity to
raise and present questions about the scope of his or her bankruptcy
discharge. The scope of discharge is an issue ancillary to the criminal
charge, 10 ' and it cannot be addressed by the state criminal court.
97. Id. at 251-52.
98. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1971).
99. Id.
100. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971) ("Here a proceeding was already pending in
the state court, affording [the defendant] an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. There is
no suggestion that this single prosecution against [the defendant] is brought in bad faith or is only
one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will be subjected. In other words, the injury that
[he] faces is solely 'that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith,'
and therefore under the settled doctrine we have already described he is not entitled to equitable
relief 'even if such statutes are unconstitutional."' (citation omitted) (quoting Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943) and Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941))).
101. Cf Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding Younger inapplicable
when state defendant had no procedural mechanism to raise constitutional challenges to a state
statute mandating repayment as a condition of probation).
At least one case, Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250 (1lth Cir. 1982), appears to be to the
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Dischargeability, unlike unconstitutionality in Younger, is not a substantive
defense.
An even more important policy consideration was that of avoiding an
affront to state courts, which Younger relied upon and Mitchum set aside in
light of Congress's intent to "interpose the federal courts ... as guardians of
the people's federal rights. .. ."'2 In the bankruptcy context, however, any
concern about impugning the competence of state courts is quite beside the
point. Here, the argument is even more powerful than it was in Mitchum, for
it is not merely Congress that has imposed the federal courts; it is the
Constitution itself. The Constitution allocates governance over bankruptcy

contrary:
If Barnette believed the prosecution for theft was a subterfuge for collection of a debt, he
could have raised the issue as a defense in the state criminal proceeding. See Tolbert v.
State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So. 2d 227, 232 (1975). In Younger terms, Barnette may have
contested the purported debt collection in a single criminal proceeding.
Barnette, 673 F.2d at 1252. The Tolbert case, cited in Barnette, involved a defendant charged under
the state's bad check statute who alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on several grounds.
Tolbert, 321 So. 2d at 230. Bankruptcy was not involved. The court's statement regarding the
defendant's right to assert defenses came in response to the defendant's allegation that her due
process rights were violated, id. at 231, 232,-a proposition that has no bearing whatsoever on the
question of whether a "defense" of dischargeability in bankruptcy can be asserted in a state criminal
prosecution.
The court in Barnette did not bother to note that, on the very page it cited, Tolbert aimed
pointed criticism at the use of bad check statutes as a debt collection device:
Petitioner next contends that the act is nothing more than a means whereby a criminal
statute is used to enforce a civil debt, and therefore is violative of [the state constitutional
provision banning imprisonment for debt]. Every state in the union, except Vermont, has
a criminal statute dealing with bad checks. Many of these statutes have been challenged
on the ground that they allow imprisonment for debt. Most of them have survived the
constitutional challenge. But we agree with the petitioner that if improperly employed to
collect a civil debt, such would be an unconstitutional application of such statutes. We
further agree that such statutes lend themselves to use by the unscrupulous who seek only
payment of debts and have no interest in criminal prosecution other than as a means of
collecting money allegedly due them. This court has repeatedly condemned the use of
threat of prosecution as a means of collection of worthless checks.
Additionally, this court has spoken with respect to the constitutional provision
prohibiting imprisonment for debt, and recognized that this prohibition established a
broad public policy ". . . inimical . . . to the incarceration of a debtor as a means of

coercing payment . .. [.]" Carr v. State, 106 Ala. 35, 38, 17 So. 350, 351 (1894). Some
courts, also recognizing that such statutes can be improperly utilized, have specifically
recognized that the innocent drawer who may be wrongfully prosecuted has a remedy of
malicious prosecution against the payee.
[I]n upholding the constitutionality of the Worthless Check Act, we should not be
misunderstood as sanctioning its use for debt-collecting purposes. In addition to
subjecting himself to a suit for malicious prosecution, a party using this statute for debtcollecting purposes may be subject to liability for abuse of process.
Tolbert, 321 So. 2d at 232 (some citations omitted).
102. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
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matters exclusively to Congress, 03 and Congress has given federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.' 4 Federal courts
issuing injunctions cannot be seen as insulting the state courts when
Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional power, has constructed a
system under which particular issues are given over to the protection of
those very federal courts. If this is an affront,' 05 Congress and the
Constitution must share the blame.'0o
The argument is even stronger when the state proceeding has a
collection purpose because the affront runs the other way-the very
existence of the proceeding itself is an affront to the bankruptcy process.' 07
Such efforts at an end-run around bankruptcy discharge should have no
claim to protection, under Younger, from a federally-issued corrective order.
Thus, relief deriving from the bankruptcy court would neither hamper state
judicial proceedings that are legitimately aimed at deterring criminal
behavior' 08 nor serve as an affront to state courts.
The other policy underpinnings of Younger are similarly rebutted in a
bankruptcy context. A desire to avoid needless friction between the state
and federal systems-whether avoiding federal interference with a state's
enforcement of its substantive policies, or not disrupting a state's judicial
processes' 0 9-fades when "friction" is not needless, but is in fact a result of
the system's fundamental structure. The Supremacy Clause prohibits a state
from pursuing substantive policies that interfere with the achievement of
bankruptcy's goals, whether those policies were designed to undermine the
No greater
bankruptcy system"o or have that effect collaterally."'
103. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . To establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
105. See Redish, Doctrine of Younger, supra note 30, at 482 ("When Congress grants federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction under a particular act, it often implies something negative about state
courts.").
106. See Dennis, supra note 29, at 341 ("The words and deeds of the Farmers [sic] as well as the
structure of the Constitution itself demonstrate that Congress is the body entrusted with the task of
defining the relationship between the federal and state sovereigns."); cf Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548-49 (1984) (suggesting that the structure of the Constitution
itself regulates the balance of federal-state relations).
107. John P. Hennigan, Jr., Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Law in the Federal System, 19
CONN. L. REV. 89, 123 (1986) ("If bankruptcy law entitles a debtor to be free of collection
proceedings, those proceedings hardly provide an adequate forum for asserting federal rights.").
The same proposition can be drawn from the contexts of speedy trials and double jeopardy.
In those cases, courts grant relief despite Younger "because the proceeding itself represents the harm
that the constitutional provision protects against." Simon, supra note 40, at 1378.
108. For a discussion of a statute not directed at genuinely criminal behavior, see infra notes 283308 and accompanying text.
109. See supratext accompanying note 43.
110. For example, statutory liens that are effective only in the event of insolvency or upon
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 545(1) because
they are "thinly disguised attempts to impose state-determined priorities in bankruptcy." In re
Loretto Winery Ltd., 898 F.2d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 1990).
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disruption of state judicial processes can be found than the automatic stay,
which brings most judicial proceedings to a screeching halt.1 12
When discharge first became a feature of bankruptcy under English law
three hundred years ago, failure to pay one's debt was a criminal'"-even
Because discharge effectively opened the doors of the
capital"' 4-offense.
15
debtors' prison,' bankruptcy has been in tension with criminal law from the
earliest days:
But at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws
calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of
humanity as well as justice: and to that end they confer some
privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or
debtor himself. On the creditors, by compelling the bankrupt to
give up all his effects to their use, without any fraudulent
concealment: on the debtor, by exempting him from the rigor of the
general law, whereby his person might be confined at the discretion
of his creditor, though in reality he has nothing to satisfy the debt:
whereas the law of bankrupts, taking into consideration the sudden
and unavoidable accidents to which men in trade are liable, has
given them the liberty of their persons, and some pecuniary
emoluments, upon condition they surrender up their whole estate to
be divided among their creditors.

S11l.For example, a trustee may assign certain executory contracts and unexpired leases even
though otherwise-applicable state law would prohibit an assignment. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2006).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 175-98.
113. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 470-71 n.l (15th
ed. 1809) ("Throughout the three first statutes the bankrupt is uniformly called an offender, and the
original design of the bankrupt laws appears to have been to prevent and defeat the frauds of
criminal debtors .. . .").
114. In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356(2006), the Court noted that at
the time of the Constitutional Convention death was "the ultimate penalty for debt then in effect in
England." Id. at 369. Apparently, the only vote cast at the Convention against inclusion of the
Bankruptcy Clause was based on fear that it would authorize a similar penalty for debt in the United
States. Id.
115. The Court reviewed this history in Katz:
The term "discharge" historically had a dual meaning; it referred to both release of debts
and release of the debtor from prison. Indeed, the earliest English statutes governing
bankruptcy and insolvency authorized discharges of persons, not debts. One statute
enacted in 1649 was entitled "An Act for discharging Poor Prisoners u-table to satisfie
their Creditors." The stated purpose of the Act was to "Discharge . . . the person of [the]
Debtor" "of and from his or her Imprisonment." Not until 1705 did the English
Parliament extend the discharge (and then only for traders and merchants) to include
release of debts.
Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
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In this respect our legislature seems to have attended to the
example of the Roman law. I mean not the terrible law of the
twelve tables; whereby the creditors might cut the debtor's body in
pieces, and each of them take his proportionable share .... But I
mean the law of cession, introduced by the christian emperors;
whereby if a debtor ceded, or yielded up all his fortune to his
creditors, he was secured from being dragged to a [jail] ....
That tension remains to this day, in the sense that the Bankruptcy Code
requires an examination into the character of a proceeding in order to
determine whether its purpose is the collection of a dischargeable debt. The
fact that "Our Federalism" compels deference when a genuinely penal
statute is at issuel1 7 does not alter the propriety of the inquiry.
One of the justifications for Younger-that it expresses a forum
allocation preference'-is not as directly rebutted, because state courts
share jurisdiction over certain grounds for nondischargeability of debts in
bankruptcy." 9 The availability of removal, however, makes federal courts
the preferred (and usual) forum even when state courts can otherwise hear
the case.120
Rather than searching for exceptions to Younger that might permit an
injunction in a particular case, it makes much more sense to acknowledge
that Younger's policy justifications do not survive close scrutiny in the
bankruptcy context (setting aside the question whether they survive close
scrutiny in any context at all). Professor Redish's separation-of-powers
critique' 2' is equally applicable to a bankruptcy system in which Congress
has allocated jurisdiction, in the proper exercise of its constitutionallyconferred power, to federal courts. Those courts should be no more able to
116. BLACKSTONE, supra note 113, at 471-72 (footnote omitted).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
118. See supra text accompanying note 32.
119. Section 523(c)(1) requires that the dischargeability of certain types of debts-specifically,
debts based on the debtor's fraud, § 523(a)(2), breach of fiduciary duty or larceny, § 523(a)(4), and
debts incurred as a result of willful and malicious injury, § 523(a)(6)-be timely litigated in the
bankruptcy court. If nondischargeability on those three grounds is not raised in the bankruptcy
court, the debts are discharged and nondischargeability cannot be raised later. 11 U.S.C. §523(c)(1)
(2006). Nondischargeability of other debts, however, including those for certain fines, penalties and
forfeitures, § 523(a)(7), can be litigated after the bankruptcy case is over, in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
120. If a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over a proceeding filed in state court after the
bankruptcy case has begun, that matter can be removed from state court to the bankruptcy forum.
Proceedings dealing with the dischargeability of particular debts are within the core jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I), and, thus, subject to removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). If
the bankruptcy case has already been closed, it can be reopened for the purpose of hearing the issue.
See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); Aguiluz v. Bayhi (In re Bayhi), 528 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2008) (bankruptcy
reopened to hear matter, removed from state court, dealing with nondischargeability of a student
loan under § 523(a)(8)); Kowalski v. Romano (In re Romano), 59 F. App'x 709 (6th Cir. 2003)
(approving reopening of bankruptcy case, thirteen years later, to hear nondischargeability issues).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
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abstain in bankruptcy matters, when jurisdiction is given, than in civil rights
cases. (This proposition is hardly novel; the notion that federal courts
should not eschew their conferred jurisdiction has a venerable history. 122)
This text-based critique is even more direct in the bankruptcy context than in
Younger, given the fact that bankruptcy is an express exception to the AntiInjunction Act. If that exception is to have any force, it must mean
something like what it says.
This argument runs headlong into Mitchum's suggestion that finding an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not displace Younger. One crucial
difference between bankruptcy and the civil rights context, however, should
be of determinative significance. Section 1983, although a monumental
piece of legislation, is comprised of only seventy-three words. Within those
few words are no standards governing the propriety of an injunction in a
particular case. One of the reasons for not finding § 1983 an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, pre-Mitchum, was concern that doing so would
open a floodgate of casesl23 or create other similarly "disastrous" results. 124
Section 1983, a generic civil rights statute, applies to a limitless array of

122. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("It is most true that this Court
will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it
should.... We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."); New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. (NOPSI) v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) ("Our cases
have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise
of jurisdiction that has been conferred."); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 813 (1976) ("Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule.").
The Court in NOPSI addressed the juxtaposition of these two concepts-that courts should
not abstain from exercising their conferred jurisdiction, on the one hand, and abstention from
interference with state proceedings, on the other-by asserting that the former
does not eliminate, however, and the categorical assertions based upon it do not call into
question, the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of
relief-a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the
statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted. Thus, there are some classes of cases in
which the withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with
state proceedings is "the normal thing to do," Younger v. Harris,401 U.S., at 45.
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted). This attempted reconciliation falls quite short because,
as Professor Redish noted years before NOPSI was decided, Younger does not represent a grant of
"judicial discretion to restrike the balance in individual cases." Redish, Abstention, supranote 29, at
88. Rather, its "narrow set of rarely-used exceptions" renders its abstention "all but total." Id.
123. Cf Redish, Abstention, supra note 29, at 85 ("Statutes such as § 1983 . . . use language
which, if woodenly and anachronistically read, can be interpreted to provide an 'absolute' right of
access to the federal courts." (quoting Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 622 n.49 (1981))).
124. See id. at 92. Such concerns are hardly applicable in bankruptcy, given that the parties are
already involved in a federal court proceeding before a judge charged with determining pertinent
issues, such as the dischargeability of particular debts.
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possible constitutional violations. Although it is an exception to the AntiInjunction Act (per Mitchum), standards are needed because our dual
structure of legislative and judicial authority could sensibly envision that an
injunction should not be permissible in every case involving that exception.
Younger provides the standard-federal courts might properly exercise
discretion, despite the presence of a (judicially-created) statutory
exception,125 and Younger provides the otherwise-missing, but necessary,
filter.
Treating Younger as a separate hurdle, standing beside and independent
of the Anti-Injunction Act, makes more sense in the context of § 1983 than
in the context of bankruptcy, given § 1983's lack of standards by which to
determine whether an injunction, although not barred by the Act, is
appropriate in a particular case. Bankruptcy provides its own filter,
however, through the Bankruptcy Code's thorough and complex statutory
structure. The Bankruptcy Code is a statute not of seventy-three words, but
of many thousands. Within its confines are at least three different sources of
injunction,126 each cabined by appropriate and detailed standards.127
The irrelevance of Younger is perhaps best illustrated by a hypothetical.
Suppose that state taxing authorities begin civil collection proceedings
against a taxpayer who files bankruptcy three weeks later. Cases decided
since Younger have held its principles applicable to civil proceedings when
an important state interest is involved,128 and tax collection is surely such an
interest-perhaps even the most important of a state's civil concerns. Yet
bankruptcy clearly stops such a proceeding,129 Younger and its progeny
notwithstanding.1 30
This outcome is so widely understood that no discussion of Younger
125. This is the way that several commentators interpret Younger, outside of the bankruptcy
context. Professor Friedman, for example, proposed a "revisionist" answer to Professor Redish's
separation-of-powers concerns:
The difficulty with congressionally granted jurisdiction is that, as with much legislation,
those statutory allocations necessarily are somewhat imprecise. Given the nature of
Congress' task, it is difficult for Congress to draft jurisdictional statutes that do anything
more than carve out rough contours as to when federal jurisdiction is necessary or
inappropriate. Oftentimes, those grants are overbroad, and the Supreme Court has sought
to make a more sensitive allocation.
Friedman, supra note 30, at 599 (footnote omitted); see also Brown, supra note 1, at 142-43 ("An
alternative response to Professor Redish's strict reading of the statutes is to view them as important,
even central, but not as providing definitive answers or as constituting the only source to which one
must look to resolve questions of abstention and similar matters.... [Ilt makes sense under this view
to consider Congress as having enacted them against a background of traditions and understandings
about how courts operate.").
126. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362(a), 524 (2006).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 175-215.
128. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,423 (1979).
129. Admittedly, in this hypothetical the injunction comes through the vehicle of § 362 rather than
§ 105 or §524, but that difference is unimportant for purposes of the illustration.
130. See, e.g., Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 25 (2000) (noting that tax litigation
pending at the time the taxpayer files for bankruptcy is subject to the automatic stay).
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ever appears, but a broad interpretation of Younger (as it has evolved) would
lead to the opposite conclusion-that no bankruptcy stay can ever halt a
proceeding in which a state has an important interest, unless of course one of
Younger's exceptions is applicable. Younger is absent in this case not
because an exception is found; rather, Younger is absent because it is totally
irrelevant and inapplicable in the first place. The Bankruptcy Code provides
authority that is both necessary and sufficient. Without doubt, bankruptcy
injunctions are appropriate when the core functions of bankruptcy are at
stake, despite the high degree of a state's interest in particular proceedings.
The Bankruptcy Code-alone-is applicable, and it-alone--defines the
limits of appropriate injunctions.
Nothing in Younger compels a different conclusion. In fact, Younger
was built around a call for balancing the interests of the state and federal
governments.' 3' In the bankruptcy arena, the Bankruptcy Code itself strikes
the necessary balance. Here, Younger is, very simply, superfluous.
This approach is much more satisfactory than an effort to squeeze within
one of Younger's exceptions, even if that effort is occasionally successful.
Arguably, "extraordinary circumstances" are present not only when the
prosecution is venal, but also when Congress, in the exercise of its power
under Article I, § 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, has committed the issue to
the federal courts. Otherwise, in order to defeat the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, powerful creditors need only obtain the sympathetic ear
of a state legislature willing to clothe collection proceedings in criminal
garb.132 One can imagine the appeal of such "criminalized" collection
statutes in states that are home to major credit card issuers.'33 The effect
131. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("The concept [of 'Our Federalism'] does not
mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every
important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."). The "balance"
actually struck in Younger was decidedly tipped in favor of the states, however. Haberfelde, supra
note 33, at 1561.
132. Creditors clearly have already done so, at least as far as bad check statutes are concerned.
See infra notes 283-308 and accompanying text. They also have done so in other, more
particularized, instances. See infra note 279.
133. Apparently only one commentator (so far) has intimated that the failure to pay credit card
obligations should be criminalized. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L.
REV. 79 (2000). Professor Zywicki discerned no "principled distinction" between a credit card
obligation and the obligation on a check:
Everyone knows that you are only supposed to write checks if you have adequate funds
to honor them. The burden is on the check-writer to be responsible to make sure that she
has sufficient funds to honor the check-it is not the bank's responsibility. Again, it is
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would be to undermine Congress's carefully crafted balancing of the
interests of debtors vis-A-vis creditors and of creditors among themselves.
Nothing could be more damaging to a bankruptcy system committed to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.'34
This goes beyond a suggestion that Younger is inapplicable in areas
preempted by federal law.1 35 The usual understanding of the preemption
doctrine prescribes that, under the Supremacy Clause, states may not enact
laws inconsistent with federal statutes and that state courts must interpret
and enforce federal statutes.136 Bankruptcy laws are no different than other
federal statutes in the first respect-states may no more enact insolvency
laws that are inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code than they may enact
statutes inconsistent with other federal provisions.' 37 In the second respect,
however, bankruptcy is not just another field subject to federal preemption;
it is not similar to civil rights matters, which are within the power and
(presumably138 ) the competence of state courts. In bankruptcy matters, state
courts generally may not interpret and enforce the federal law.'39 Instead, by
committing bankruptcy matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts, federal law supplants state insolvency laws not only substantively,
but jurisdictionally as well. Bankruptcy is, by its nature, a "federaljudicial
process." 40 State courts have no role.
hard to see how this responsibility changes when an individual uses a credit card to pay
for the purchase, rather than a check. In both cases, the individual is promising to honor
the obligation with sufficient cash revenues when the appropriate time comes.
Id. at 90. Interestingly, Professor Zywicki seems to have given no thought to the possibility that the
real transgression may lie in criminalizing the nonpayment of debts when those debts take the form
of bad checks, rather than in failing to expand the types of debts for which imprisonment may be
imposed. Cf William Waller, Kickin'em While They're Down: Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 35 J.
ECON. IssuEs 871, 877 (2001) (stating, hopefully as a sarcastic exaggeration, that "from the
creditor's perspective things have really gone to hell since the death penalty for bankruptcy was
lifted.").
Fortunately, other commentators apparently disagree. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin,
Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 2124, 2138 (2003) ("Over the
centuries it became increasingly clear that holding the debtor's body in prison was an inadequate
means of achieving the economic equivalent to contractual performance.").
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006) (conferring exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings
to the federal courts).
135. See supra note 52.
136. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that federal law preempts
state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress" pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution).
137. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) ("In view of this grant of authority [over
bankruptcy] to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state laws to the extent that
they conflict with the laws of Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of
bankruptcies are suspended.").
138. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the scope of state court jurisdiction over issues of dischargeability, see
supra note 120.
140. Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity:
The Bankruptcy Power as a FederalForum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 95, 129 (2007).
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The approach advocated here is perhaps a rejection of Professor
Redish's separation-of-powers critique, which might be construed as a call
for no exercise of discretion in any of the cases falling within an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act,141 whether that exception is § 1983, bankruptcy,
or something else.142 This approach, however, is more modest; it leaves
Younger and Mitchum intact in the context out of which they arose-civil
rightsl 43-while simultaneously curtailing extension of the abstention
doctrine into the markedly different arena of bankruptcy. It also has the
advantage of negating the necessity for strained efforts to find an applicable
exception to Younger.

Professor Brubaker's argument was developed in the wake of Central Virginia Community College
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), as a possible solution to sovereign immunity questions:
If federal bankruptcy "law," in its essence, is creation of a federal judicial process, then
Congress's acknowledged power to directly regulate states, and thus subject the states to
the force of supreme federal bankruptcy "laws," implies that Congress has the power to
subject states to the bankruptcy jurisdiction of federal courts and bind states to that
uniform federal judicial process, because that's what federal bankruptcy "law" is. The
peculiar accommodation of state sovereignty embodied in the Seminole-Alden framework
simply does not work for bankruptcy "law." It is totally contradictory and nonsensical to
say that states are bound by federal bankruptcy "law," but that their constitutional
sovereign immunity exempts them from being subjected to the jurisdiction of federal
bankruptcy courts, if that federal judicial process is federal bankruptcy "law." On this
reasoning, then, bankruptcy is simply an exception to state sovereign immunity.
Brubaker, supra at 129 (footnotes omitted). Although Professor Brubaker confessed a personal
disbelief in his theory because of its lack of limits, see id. at 131, the theory does provide a useful
analogy to the abstention context.
141. See Brown, supra note 1, at 141-42.
142. For a discussion of the statutory and judicially-created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act,
see supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
143. The Supreme Court has only occasionally engaged in a Younger analysis outside the context
of § 1983. In NOPSI, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), the Court held Younger inapplicable and reversed the
lower court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction to review non-judicial ratemaking
proceedings. Id. at 353, 369, 373. In the course of its opinion, the Court cautioned "that federal
courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred." Id. at
358. The Court did not mention the Anti-Injunction Act, but its holding-that the state action was
not a "proceeding" to which Younger applied, id. at 369-70,-would have also supported a holding
that the Anti-Injunction Act was similarly inapplicable. In the context at issue in this Article, the
Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable not because the requisite type of "proceeding" is lacking, but
because bankruptcy is an express exception.
144. One of the exceptions-for bad faith or harassment in the prosecution-is often at issue.
See, e.g., P. Steven Kratsch & William E. Young, Criminal Prosecutions and Manipulative
Restitution: The Use ofState Criminal Courtsfor ContraventionofDebtor Relief 1984 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 107, 117. The Bankruptcy Code, however, is relevant only to debt collection. The
private motives of prosecutors and the animus, or lack thereof, lurking behind their prosecutions is
not bankruptcy's business. When bankruptcy's central purposes are implicated and compromised,
the court's focus should rest on correction and repair; the prosecutor's motives remain irrelevant.
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E. The Sovereign Immunity Analogy

Younger relied heavily on varying kinds of interests that a state enjoys,
such as its interest in pursuing its substantive legislative goalsl 45 and its
interest in noninterference with the functioning of its courts.146 Despite the
importance and validity of these interests, this Article argues that they are
not determinative of-or even relevant to-questions regarding the
appropriateness of an injunction in a particular bankruptcy case. Support for
that argument can be drawn from an analogous context-sovereign
immunity. Younger and sovereign immunity are different aspects of
federalism, directed at different types of intrusion upon the states. Under the
former, a state court is protected from a federally-issued injunction; under
the latter, a state is protected from being subjected to a federally-based
lawsuit. In both situations, however, states are subjected to some sort of
intrusive federal process. Thus, consideration of sovereign immunity helps
illuminate the present discussion.
The leading and most recent sovereign immunity case in the bankruptcy
field is Central Virginia Community College v. Katz. 4 7 In Katz, the Court
drew "[t]he ineluctable conclusion ... that States agreed in the plan of the
Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have
had in proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies."' 1 48 In so holding, the Court rested on reasoning having
remarkable resonance with Younger and Mitchum.
The Katz Court reviewed the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, 149
finding that the Framers intended it to constitute a federal response to
problems presented by states' refusals to honor discharges granted by sister
states.so The Bankruptcy Clause is broader than its animating purpose,
145. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
146. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
147. 546 U.S. 356 (2006). In Katz, a bookstore filed bankruptcy within ninety days of making
payments to several state educational institutions. See id. at 360. The trustee sought to avoid the
payments as preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), and to recover the money for the benefit of the
estate. See id. The creditors' motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity was denied
by the bankruptcy court. See id. The district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the grounds
that Congress had abrogated sovereign immunity in § 106 of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 361.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide that question, see id., which had been left
open by its earlier opinion in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), the
decision in Katz did not rest on § 106. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 362.
148. Katz, 546 U.S. at 377.
149. This parallels the historical survey undertaken by the court in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238-43 (1972), to support the conclusion that Congress intended, via § 1983, to impose the
federal courts between the states and the people, in order to guard against state action violative of
constitutional rights. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
150. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 377. The Court discussed two cases, James v. Allen, I U.S. (1. DalI.)
188 (1786), and Millar v. Hall, I U.S. (1 DalI.) 229 (1788), in which debtors whose debts were
discharged in New Jersey and Maryland, respectively, were arrested for nonpayment of debts when
they crossed into Pennsylvania. In the former case, the court held that discharge under New Jersey's
insolvency laws was effective only in New Jersey. See James, I U.S. at 190. In the latter, the court
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however, because "its coverage encompasses the entire 'subject of
Bankruptcies."'" The Framers understood that the Clause would permit
federal courts to issue orders-any orders, including those sounding in
equity-ancillary to bankruptcy's in rem 5 jurisdiction. 5 As support, the
Court pointed to passage of the first bankruptcy legislation in 1800,154 which
included a specific grant of habeas corpus power to federal courts to order
the release of debtors from state prisons'-sixty-seven years before that
writ became available to state prisoners generally.156 The Court found the
grant of habeas power "remarkable,"'17 in part, because no objection to it
was raised at a time that was "rife with discussion of States' sovereignty and
their amenability to suit.""'
Thus, the Court concluded that the states had "agreed in the plan of the
Convention" 5 9 to forego sovereign immunity defenses, as far as bankruptcy
proceedings were concerned:
The scope of this consent was limited; the jurisdiction exercised in
bankruptcy proceedings was chiefly in rem-a narrow jurisdiction
that does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same degree
as other kinds of jurisdiction. But while the principal focus of the
bankruptcy proceedings is and was always the res, some exercises
of bankruptcy courts' powers-issuance of writs of habeas corpus
included-unquestionably involved more than mere adjudication of
rights in a res. In ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the States
acquiesced in a subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they
might otherwise have asserted in proceedings necessary to
60
effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.1
The Court offered one caveat, or narrowing principle: "We do not mean
to suggest that every law labeled a 'bankruptcy' law could, consistent with
held that discharge in one state is sufficient to constitute discharge everywhere. See Millar, I U.S. at
232. Interestingly, the same lawyer won both cases, representing the creditor in the former and the
debtor in the latter. He was also a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. See Katz, 546 U.S. at
366-68.
151. Katz, 546 U.S. at 370.
152. Id. at 362 ("Bankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem.").
153. Id. at 370.
154. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 18-19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
155. See id., ch. 19, § 38, 2 Stat. at 32.
156. Katz, 546 U.S. at 374.
157. Id. at 374.
158. Id. at 375.
159. Id. at 377.
160. Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
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the Bankruptcy Clause, properly impinge upon state sovereign immunity."'61
Thus, only those provisions that are enacted in furtherance of the bankruptcy
power, however the scope of that power is determined,162 can be enforced
without regard to sovereign immunity.' 63
Admittedly, Katz presents substantial analytical problems in its own
right.'" Perhaps Katz was ultimately made necessary by the Court's
decades of incoherent Eleventh Amendment analysis, beginning with its
refusal to read and apply the Amendment as written 6 and continuing
through its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.'66 If so, one
cannot help but notice a parallel to the Court's failure to read the AntiInjunction Act as written and, instead, its crafting in Younger of a judicial
doctrine that effectively repeals statutory provisions.
In any event, much of what the Court said in KatZl67 applies directly to
an analysis of Younger. First, the in rem nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction
recalls the judicially-created in rem exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.'68
Although not necessarily apropos, given that Mitchum treated Younger as
operating within an exception to the Act,' 69 Younger regarded the AntiInjunction Act as informative on the question of policy. If bankruptcy's in
rem nature justifies the setting aside of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
matters, then that nature should similarly justify setting aside judiciallycreated limits on federal injunctions issued to effectuate provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Secondly, because the Bankruptcy Clause is grounded historically in
vindicating bankruptcy discharge through the release of imprisoned debtors,
161. Id.at378n.15.
162. See Brubaker, supranote 140, at 131-33.
163. See generally Randolph J. Haines, Federalism Principlesin Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135 (2007).
164. See generally Brubaker, supra note 140; Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy
After Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 59 (2007); Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield,
Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and the Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious
Case of Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 13 (2007).
165. See Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1475-76 (1987);
Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years ofFolly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 51 (1990); Redish & Greenfield, supra note 164, at 20.
166. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
167. Because the Court's earlier decision in Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541
U.S. 440 (2004), involved discharge, and this Article is concerned with the protection of discharge, it
may appear that Hood is more relevant than Katz. That is true to the extent that Hood characterized
the adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability of a particular debt involved in that case as
ancillary to bankruptcy's in rem jurisdiction. See id. at 447. On the other hand, Hood stressed that
the debtor's efforts did not expose the state to coercive process, see id. at 450, and distinguished a
proceeding to recover a preference, see id. at 454,-the type of process involved in Katzpresumably as an example of the type of coercive process that does constitute an affront to state
sovereign immunity. Thus, Katz involved a coercive process much more akin to a federally-issued
injunction, making it the more relevant of the two cases.
168. See supra note 14.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
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the Framers would have expected bankruptcy's power to be focused on state
officials and, perhaps, state courts.170 Here, of course, the federal
bankruptcy power is not being used to deal with the states' failure to
recognize discharges granted by sister states; rather, it is being used to
address the failure of some states to respect the scope of discharge granted
by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code. Either way, invocation of a federal
court's power vindicates the discharge authorized by the Bankruptcy
Code.' 71
Finally, the Katz Court concluded that a federal judicial process
constituting an affront to state sovereign immunity is permissible as long as
it is within the power granted to Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause. 172 The
tension between the state and federal sovereigns, inherent in the context of
sovereign immunity,' is not unlike the systemic tension that arises when a
federal court enjoins a state proceeding. If the affront involved in the
sovereign immunity context is rooted in the Constitution itself, and hence
permissible, then the affront inherent when injunctions are issued to enforce
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are similarly systemic and permissible.
Younger's concern about such an affront is neither here nor there.17 4
The only question left, therefore, is to ask what the Bankruptcy Code
provides.

170. To the extent that "imprisonment for debt was not a criminal proceeding," the interests of
states in enforcing their criminal laws would not have been implicated. Plank, supra note 164, at
78-79.
171. One cannot say that a federal injunction in this circumstance vindicates any purpose the
Framers might have had in regards to discharge, because discharge did not become a feature of
bankruptcy law for another 100 years. See Brubaker, supra note 140, at 130-31. Rather, a federal
injunction vindicates a more modem bankruptcy purpose, but a purpose no less essential for its
modernity.
172. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006).
173. See Brubaker,supranote 140, at 126.
Of course, the concurrent propositions of states' sovereign immunity and Congress's
plenary legislative powers are at cross-purposes with one another. Congress's Article I
power to regulate the conduct of the states is inevitably undermined to the extent the
states retain an immunity from suits to enforce valid federal laws....
The internal tension thus created between state sovereign immunity and the role of the
federal courts in enforcing the supremacy of federal law is nowhere more evident than
with respect to federal bankruptcy laws, which by their very nature exist as a federal
judicial process.
Id.
174. See Haines, supra note 163, at 139 ("[T]he complete 'alienation of State sovereignty' implies
not only that sovereign immunity is inapplicable, but also that federalism principles in general
should have no place in bankruptcy law, except to the extent otherwise indicated by Congress.
Indeed, in the absence of an express indication of contrary Congressional intent, courts should
assume that Congress intended to establish a uniform national law on the subject of bankruptcy that
pays no heed whatsoever to state law.").
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III.

INJUNCTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Bankruptcy Code determines the availability of an injunction when
a state criminal proceeding is used to collect a dischargeable debt, and the
Code's provisions permit an injunction in an appropriate case.
The Bankruptcy Code has three independent, but interrelated, provisions
under which injunctions may issue-§ 362, § 105 and § 524. The first of
these, § 362, is the well-known automatic stay-"that miraculous
omnipresence""'-which becomes effective upon the initiation of a
bankruptcy proceeding.'" Section 362(a) provides for an automatic stay,
"applicable to all entities," of any sort of proceeding designed "to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
[bankruptcy] case."' 78 The automatic stay is subject to a number of
exceptions, however, enumerated in § 362(b).17 9 Among them is § 362(b)(1),
which provides an exception for "the commencement
or continuation of a
80
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor."',
Section 362(b)(1) removes criminal proceedings from the reach of the
automatic stay, but it does nothing more than this. The exception does not
address and does not affect the applicability of other injunctive provisions
found in the Bankruptcy Code. 82 Proceedings that are nominally criminal
175. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
176. In re Brown, 39 B.R. 820, 827 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
178. Id § 362(a).
179. Id § 362(b).
180. Id. § 362(b)(1). Subsection 362(b)(4), which excepts proceedings in exercise of police or
regulatory power from the automatic stay, adds nothing to the analysis. Criminal proceedings are
most directly addressed by § 362(b)(1), and it is more than sufficient to make the automatic stay
inapplicable.
181. Id.
182. Indeed, § 362(b)(1) does not affect the applicability of non-injunctive Bankruptcy Code
provisions either, as illustrated by PennsylvaniaDepartment of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552 (1990). In that case, the Court held that a criminal restitution obligation could be
discharged in Chapter 13 (as then drafted). Amicus argued, inter alia, that § 362(b)(1) reflected
congressional intent to except such an obligation from discharge because "it would be anomalous to
construe the [Bankruptcy] Code as eliminating a haven for criminal offenders under the automatic
stay provision while granting them sanctuary from restitution obligations under Chapter 13." Id. at
560. The Court rejected that argument, however:
We find no inconsistency in these provisions. Section 362(b)(1) ensures that the
automatic stay provision is not construed to bar federal or state prosecution of alleged
criminal offenses. It is not an irrational or inconsistent policy choice to permit
prosecution of criminal offenses during the pendency of a bankruptcy action and at the
same time to preclude probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a debtor
seeks relief under Chapter 13. Congress could well have concluded that maintaining
criminal prosecutions during bankruptcy proceedings is essential to the functioning of
government but that, in the context of Chapter 13, a debtor's interest in full and complete
release of his obligations outweighs society's interest in collecting or enforcing a
restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the Chapter 13 plan.
Id. at 560-61. Chapter 13 has since been amended by the addition of § 1328(a)(3), which
legislatively reversed Davenport.

32

[Vol. 38: 1, 20101

Bankruptcy Federalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

get an automatic pass rather than an automatic stay under 362, but they
This is made
may then be subjected to the case-by-case inquiry of § 105.
abundantly clear in prominent Bankruptcy Code commentary, in the Code's
legislative history, and in numerous cases.
COLLIER's explains it as follows: "Notwithstanding the exemption from
the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court still retains the power to enjoin
these acts if, under section 105, the traditional factors favoring an injunction
are present." 84 Other commentators agree. Professors Epstein, Nickels, and
White, authors of another leading bankruptcy treatise, write that "[a]ny
action that escapes the stay, either because the action is not covered by
section 362(a) or is excepted by (b), is nevertheless subject to discretionary
injunction based on section 105(a)."
The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code, cited in COLLIER'S
analysis of this proposition, is consistent:
The effect of an exception is not to make the action immune from
injunction.
The court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by
the automatic stay. Section 105 . . . grants the power to issue orders

necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11 ....
By excepting an act or action from the automatic stay, the bill
simply requires that the trustee move the court into action, rather
than requiring the stayed party to request relief from the stay. There
are some actions, enumerated in the exceptions, that generally
should not be stayed automatically upon the commencement of the
case, for reasons of either policy or practicality. Thus, the court will
have to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular
action which may be harming the estate should be stayed.186
While § 105 does not constitute a roving commission to be used by the
bankruptcy court "as a panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy

183. See 11 U.S.C. §§105, 362(b)(1).
184. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 105.04[3], at 105-78 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010).
185.

1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY

§ 3-21(e)(ii),

at

244 (1992); see also id. § 3-22, at 245 ("The stay of section 362(a) is the only injunction that results
automatically from the debtor's bankruptcy, but section 362(a) is not the only law for enjoining
conduct that affects the bankruptcy.").
186. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 51 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 342 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298.
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case,"187 or as permission to contradict specific provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code,188 neither is it so narrow that it can be used only when a specific
Bankruptcy Code provision expressly justifies it.' 89 Rather, § 105 is
appropriately used to achieve the purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy
Code as expressed in the statute itself. Thus, obligations that vindicate a
state's penal interest, as well as debts shown to have been incurred through a
debtor's fraud, will be nondischargeable-these obligations will not be
affected by any of the three injunctions in the Bankruptcy Code. But
nominally-criminal proceedings that are collection proceedings at heart will
be caught, as they should be.
Court decisions reinforce this interpretation of § 362(b). In Sylvestre v.
Safeway, Inc. (In re Sylvestre),o90 the court held that

§ 362(b)(1) applies to

all criminal actions, but observed that the Bankruptcy Code's other
injunctive provisions remain available: "Clearly the use of criminal process
to collect debts may frustrate the purpose of the automatic stay. The
remedy, however, lies in a separate injunction."' 9 ' Similarly, the court in
Gruntz v. County ofLos Angeles (In re Gruntz), noted that

§ 105 is available

when an exception renders the automatic stay inapplicable.192 These cases,
and others, make the law clear on this point-the only effect of § 362(b)(1)'s
exception is to require the court to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether the state proceeding can be enjoined under one of the Bankruptcy
Code's other injunctive provisions.
Sections 362(b) and 105 are routinely applied in exactly that fashion in
cases presenting other fact patterns. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin,93 for
example, the court stated that § 105 is properly used "'to enjoin actions
excepted from the automatic stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative
process whether in a liquidation or in a reorganization case."'l 94 Thus, § 105
permitted the bankruptcy court to enjoin proceedings against non-debtorsthe debtor's co-defendants in tort suits-despite the limitation of § 362(a)'s
automatic stay to proceedings directed toward debtors, because continuation
of the suits would thwart the debtor's effort to obtain benefits the
Bankruptcy Code was designed to provide.'95
It would be a tremendous leap to suggest, relying on the Bankruptcy
187. COLLIER, supra note 184,1105.01[2], at 105-6.
188. See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987).
189. Indeed, if that were required, § 105 would be entirely superfluous.
190. No. 91-2689, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12244 (4th Cir. May 27, 1992).
191. Id. at *3.
192. 202 F.3d 1074, 1087 (9th Cit. 2000) (en banc) ("There also is a procedural avenue to forfend
state actions that are not subject to the automatic stay but that threaten the bankruptcy estate: a
request for an injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 105. The bankruptcy court's injunctive power is not
limited by the delineated exceptions to the automatic stay, nor confined to civil proceedings.").
193. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
194. Id. at 1003 (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420,425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
195. See id. at 1008.
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Code's preliminary deference to actions that are nominally criminal (per
§ 362(b)(1)) and the apparent nondischargeability of penal obligations,1 96
that § 105's broad "all writs" provision can never apply to a state collection
proceeding masquerading as a criminal prosecution. Just as the courts
recognized in Sylvestre, Gruntz and Piccinin, § 105 may be employed to
When a
enjoin proceedings not otherwise subject to the automatic stay.
"criminal" statute is enacted and employed to serve a purely collection
purpose that would contravene the purposes of bankruptcy, as those
purposes have been expressed in the language of the Bankruptcy Code itself,
a bankruptcy court has authority under § 105 to enjoin that state
proceeding. 9 8
196. Section 523(a)(7) excepts penal obligations "payable to and for the benefit" of the
government from discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2006). Its proper interpretation is discussed
later. See infra notes 238-82 and accompanying text.
197. See Sylvestre v. Safeway, Inc. (In re Sylvestre), No. 91-2689, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12244
(4th Cir. May 27, 1992); Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074; Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994.
198. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles might appear to be
inconsistent with this assertion, because it held that the automatic stay exception for criminal
proceedings, § 362(b)(1), applies without regard to the collection motive underlying that proceeding.
See Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1085-86. There is no inconsistency because this Article agrees that
§ 362(b)(1) applies to all criminal proceedings, whether collection-oriented or not. The collection
purpose that is irrelevant under § 362(b)(1), however, is anything but irrelevant under § 105 and

§524.
Gruntz directly supports the position advocated in this Article in another respect as well. A
second issue in that case, besides the question whether the automatic stay prevents a criminal
prosecution for willful failure to pay child support, was whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
relitigation in bankruptcy court of a state criminal court judgment that the automatic stay does not
apply. See Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1078. The County had argued that it does. See id. at 1077-78.
Although Gruntz's holding in the negative has been sharply criticized, Siskin v. Complete Aircraft
Services (In re Siskin), 258 B.R. 554, 563 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001), that holding provides analogous
support for this Article's argument that the Bankruptcy Code empowers a federal court to determine
whether a state proceeding, although nominally criminal, is a collection action in disguise. Much of
what the Gruntz court said regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is equally applicable to the
federalism analysis:
[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not implicated by collateral challenges to the
automatic stay in bankruptcy. A bankruptcy court simply does not conduct an improper
appellate review of a state court when it enforces an automatic stay that issues from its
own federal statutory authority. In fact, a reverse Rooker-Feldman situation is presented
when state courts decide to proceed in derogation of the stay, because it is the state court
which is attempting impermissibly to modify the federal court's injunction.
The rule urged by the County would undermine the principle of a unified federal
bankruptcy system, as declared in the Constitution and realized through the Bankruptcy
Code. If state courts were empowered to issue binding judgments modifying the federal
injunction created by the automatic stay, creditors would be free to rush into friendly
courthouses around the nation to garner favorable relief. The bankruptcy court would
then be stripped of its ability to distribute the debtor's assets equitably, or to allow the
debtor to reorganize financial affairs. "Such an exercise of authority would be
inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts by allowing
state courts to create their own standards as to when persons may properly seek relief in
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The third bankruptcy provision under which an injunction can issue,

§ 524(a), provides that a bankruptcy discharge "operates as an injunction

against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of
process, or an act, to collect ... any [discharged] debt as a personal liability
of the debtor." 199 This permanent injunction comes into effect when
discharge is granted 200 and applies to all prepetition debts.
Because the grant of discharge simultaneously terminates the automatic
stay,201 the discharge injunction found in § 524(a) is often described as
picking up where the stay leaves off. 202 The two provisions are not coextensive, however, and § 524 must be applied according to its own terms.
No case demonstrates this better than Brown v. Shriver (In re Brown).203 In
Brown, the debtor was charged with driving under the influence and, under a
pretrial diversionary program, was ordered to pay restitution for property
damage he had caused. 20 He failed to make full restitution, which was a
condition of his probation. Instead, Brown filed bankruptcy, received a
discharge covering the obligation, 2 05 and sought an injunction against efforts
to revoke his probation. 20 The court first characterized the prosecutor's
argument that the restitution obligation was not a "debt" as requiring "a level
of distortion of language most appropriate for the actions of legislatures and
not courts." 207 The court then noted that the propriety of an injunction, once
an obligation is discharged, is not determined under § 105, with its
"principle motivation" and "bad faith" tests, 208 but under § 524.209 That
provision is not coextensive with § 362:

cases Congress has specifically precluded those courts from adjudicating." It is but slight
hyperbole to say that chaos would reign in such a system.
Gruntz, 202 F.3d at 1083-84 (quoting Gonzales v. Parks (In re Gonzales), 830 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
200. See In re Domer, 125 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
201. See 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(2)(C).
202. See, e.g., In re Dorner, 125 B.R. at 201 ("When discharge is granted, the automatic stay of
section 362 is dissolved and replaced by permanent injunctive provisions of section 524.").
203. 39 B.R. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
204. Seeid.at821.
205. See id. The court found § 523(a)(7) inapplicable because restitution was to be paid to an
aggrieved creditor rather than to the government. See id. For a discussion of the scope of
§ 523(a)(7), see infra notes 238-82 and accompanying text.
206. See Brown, 39 B.R. at 821.
207. Id. at 822.
208. Kratsch & Young, supra note 144, at 117-19. Courts asked to decide whether an exception
to Younger is appropriate have developed two principal approaches. Under one, an injunction can be
granted only if the prosecutor initiated the criminal proceeding in bad faith. Under the other, courts
look to the motives of the complaining creditor. For a discussion of the merits, and lack thereof, of
these approaches, see id. The approach advocated in this Article obviates the need for these tests,
since Younger's exceptions are irrelevant.
209. See Brown, 39 B.R. at 827 n.12.
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The entry of a discharge in bankruptcy has a broader effect than
§ 362 on criminal proceedings which involve the collection or
recovery of debt. The discharge injunction replaces the protection
afforded a debtor by the automatic stay. Unlike the stay of § 362,
there is no exception to the § 524 discharge injunction for criminal
proceedings against the debtor. A criminal proceeding continued or
initiated to recover or collect a discharged debt is enjoined by the
§ 524 discharge injunction and falls outside of the protection
otherwise afforded by the Anti-Injunction Act210] Considerations
of comity and equity are overcome by the stated Congressional
preference to protect discharged debtors in bankruptcy.21 1
Because nothing remained of the criminal court's original order but the
element of debt collection, the court in Brown held that an injunction should
issue. 212
Of course, § 524 applies only to obligations that are dischargeable. A
number of cases, including Brown, approved the use of an injunction only
because the underlying debt was dischargeable. For example, the court in In
re Penny
issued an injunction only because it found that the state
proceedings at issue were designed to collect a debt. The court added,
however, that "if the debt is ultimately found to be not dischargeable, no
federal purpose would be served by continuing to enjoin the state
prosecution, notwithstanding the court's strong opinion that such
proceedings abuse the process of courts." 214 Similarly, the court in Howard
v. Allard2 found that an injunction against the debtor's prosecution on bad
check charges was appropriate because the proceeding was intended to
collect a potentially dischargeable debt, but held that the injunction would
not be made permanent unless and until the debt was actually discharged.
Thus, a determination of dischargeability is indispensable.
210. Here, of course, the court should have referred to the protections afforded by Younger.
211. Brown, 39 B.R. at 828-29 (footnote omitted).
212. See id. at 830.
213. 414 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
214. Id.; see also Daulton v. Caldwell, 966 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992) ("It is undisputed that
the Bankruptcy Code precludes the use of criminal actions to collect debts which have been
discharged in bankruptcy."); Barnette v. Evans (In re Barnette), 673 F.2d 1250, 1253 (1lth Cir.
1982) (reversing a bankruptcy judge's injunction when the dischargeability of the debt had not yet
been determined). Significantly, the holding in In re Byrd, 256 B.R. 246, 256 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
2002)-that a debtor could not recover funds previously paid to Nevada officials in order to get out
of jail-turned in part on the court's conclusion that a restitution order would not have been
dischargeable. Although the court's reading of the Code is incorrect, see discussion infra Part IV,
the case does illustrate the importance of dischargeability to the appropriateness of injunctive relief.
215. 122 B.R. 696 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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IV. DISCHARGEABILITY OF RESTITUTIONARY OBLIGATIONS
The Bankruptcy Code has several provisions relevant to the discharge of
restitutionary obligations. Two of them are found in § 523, which applies to
all bankruptcy cases unless a particular chapter addresses the issue
directly. 2 16 The first and most important of these, § 523(a)(7), speaks not of
restitution, but of a debt "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture."217 That provision
is substantially more complicated than it first appears, and we will return to
it momentarily. The second, § 523(a)(13), prohibits the discharge of "any
payment of an order of restitution" entered pursuant to the federal criminal
code.2 18
Of the other chapters, only Chapter 13 addresses the dischargeability of
restitutionary obligations. One provision, § 1328(a)(3), prohibits the
discharge of a debt "for restitution, or a criminal fine, included in a sentence
on the debtor's conviction of a crime."219 Another, § 1328(a)(4), applies to
obligations "for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action against the
debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury" to another person.220
Chapter 11, on the other hand, simply cross-references § 523, leaving issues
of discharge in an individual debtor's Chapter 11 case to the same analysis
governing Chapter 7 cases.221
all restitutionary obligations are
Under these provisions,
nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases, and federal restitutionary obligations
are clearly nondischargeable in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. Whether
state restitutionary orders are also nondischargeable depends upon the
interpretation of § 523(a)(7).
That provision may appear, at first blush, to render debts arising out of
bad check prosecutions nondischargeable, as the Supreme Court so
interpreted in Kelly v. Robinson.222 In Kelly, the debtor pleaded guilty to
second-degree larceny for wrongfully receiving $9,933 in welfare
benefits. 22 Her prison sentence was suspended and she was placed on
probation for five years. 2 24 Probation was conditioned on restitution of the
amount wrongfully received, but the judge's order specified that she was to
pay $100 a month for as long as she was on probation.225 That created a

216.
217.
under
debts,
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

38

See 11 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
Id § 523(a)(7). If a debt is covered by § 523, it is simultaneously excepted from discharge
§727(b), which provides that a Chapter 7 discharge includes all of the debtor's prepetition
"[e]xcept as provided in section 523." Id. § 727(b).
Id. §523(a)(13).
Id. § 1328(a)(3).
Id. § 1328(a)(4).
See id. § 1141(d)(2).
479 U.S. 36 (1986).
See id. at 38.
See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 38.
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restitutionary obligation of $6,000-substantially less than the amount she
had wrongfully received.226 She later filed bankruptcy and argued that her
restitutionary obligation was discharged,227 but the Supreme Court held the
228
debt within § 523(a)(7)'s discharge exception.
The Kelly Court engaged in little, if any, hard-nosed statutory analysis.
Rather, the Court looked to pre-Code practice,229 the general policy of noninterference in state criminal proceedings, 230 and a conclusion that the
criminal justice system operates "for the benefit of society as a whole."23 1
Against that background, the Court simply asserted that nothing in
§ 523(a)(7)'s language allows the discharge of obligations for criminal
restitution, which then opened the way for the Court to focus on
federalism. 232 Essentially, the Court in Kelly found the statute satisfied by a
single factor-characterization of the debtor's obligation as a penal
sanction.233 The entire statutory analysis was collapsed into that one
element.234
Examination of the statutory language, however, casts considerable
doubt on the Court's cavalier conclusion. Section 523(a)(7) has three
requirements: (1) a debt constituting "a fine, penalty, or forfeiture;" (2) that
is "payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit;" and (3) that is
"not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.",235 If the provision is to apply,
each requirement should be met.

226. See id. at 39 n.2. The Supreme Court observed that this created "some uncertainty" as to the
amount the debtor was ordered to pay. Id.
227. See id. at 39.
228. See id. at 53.
229. See id. at 47. The Court cited Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
EnvironmentalProtection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), for the proposition that Congress is presumed to be
aware of relevant case law when it legislates on a particular issue and that it will expressly indicate
any intent to change existing law. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47. As one commentator has noted,
however, the Court overlooked the conflicting case law on the question whether criminal restitution
is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Deborah A. Ballam, Kelly v. Robinson Revisited. Dischargeability
of Restitution Obligations in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4-5
(1989).
230. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47; supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
231. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52. Perhaps the Court's failure to inquire more deeply is excusable given
that it was not confronted with a criminal statute designed primarily as a debt collection device, with
little or no penal purpose. Kelly should not be applied without a more searching analysis, however,
when collection-oriented statutes are at play.
232. See id. at 52-53.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2006).
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A. "Fine,Penalty, or Forfeiture"
The Kelly Court held that § 523(a)(7) "creates a broad exception for all
penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or
forfeitures" 236 (or, clearly, even none of the above). The only important
inquiry as far as the Court was concerned is whether the obligation is
"penal" in nature, not whether it is within the statute's express language. 2 37
Under this reasoning, restitutionary obligations will almost automatically be
swept into the statute's reach.238
This conclusion flies in the face of the usual rules of statutory
construction, which the Kelly Court seems to have cast away by calling for a
resort to statutory policy. 239 One can certainly find support for concluding
that subsection (a)(7) is targeted toward penal obligations, under the canon
of construction noscitur a sociis-"a word is known by the company it
keeps." 24 0 Thus, "fine" and "penalty" lead one to conclude that Congress
was taking aim at wrongdoing and that "forfeiture" carries a similar
connotation.24' Identifying a penal character in the phrase, however, does
not justify the Court's illogical leap to the conclusion that all penal
obligations are included. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriusinclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another 242 -counsels to the
contrary. Thus, use of the terms "fine," "penalty," and "forfeiture" carries
the implication that other types of obligations-such as restitution-are
excluded.
All of this would be true even if restitutionary obligations were in fact
penal in character. The fact that they often are not243 makes the argument
against Kelly even more compelling.

236. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 51.
237. Id. at 52-53.
238. A few obligations have escaped, however, even though apparently within the express words
of the statute. In Hickman v. Texas (In re Hickman), 260 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001), for example, the
debtor-a surety on criminal bail bonds-sought to discharge more than $50,000 in bail bond
forfeiture judgments. See id. at 401. The court concluded that the statutory phrase encompasses
penal obligations, not obligations that are essentially contractual as are the damages incurred by
professional bail bondsmen when defendants fail to appear. See id. at 407.
239. The Court asserted that "[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43 (1986).
240. Hickman, 260 F.3d at 403 (1995).
241. Id. at 403-04. This reasoning, in part, led the court in Hickman to hold bail bond forfeiture
judgments dischargeable in the bail bondsman's bankruptcy. See id. at 407.
242. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).

243. For a discussion of such a statute, see infra notes 283-308 and accompanying text.
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B.

"Payableto andfor the Benefit of a Governmental Unit"

Section 523(a)(7) only excepts from discharge those obligations
"payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit." 2" The Code's use
of the conjunction was certainly not inadvertent. To give the conjunction
effect, § 523(a)(7) can only be read to require that the obligation at issue be
payable to the government and, in addition, be for the benefit of the

government. Both elements must be satisfied in order to except the
obligation from discharge.
The Court in Kelly, of course, did not address the question of how to
interpret "for the benefit of a governmental unit"245 when the victim of the
debtor's financial fraud is not the government itself and the government is
required to pay the restitution over to a nongovernmental victim. In Kelly,
not only was the victim the government itself (because the debtor pleaded
guilty to welfare fraud),246 but the Connecticut statute at issue did not give
the victim of a debtor's financial fraud an enforceable right to receive the
proceeds of the debtor's restitution.247
Two court decisions, In re Towers248 and In re Rashid,24 9 have directly
confronted the issue of how to interpret "for the benefit of a governmental
unit" when the disappointed creditor is not the government itself and any
restitution must be paid over to that creditor. Both of these courts held that
restitution payments flowing to creditors are not made for the benefit of the
public. 250
In Towers, the State of Illinois won a civil restitution order compelling
the debtor to repay victims of his fraud.2 5 1 The State then sought a
determination that the obligation was not affected by the discharge in either
of the debtor's two subsequent Chapter 7 proceedings.252 The court
244. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2006) (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 38 (1986). That has also been true in subsequent cases.
In Thompson v. Virginia (In re Thompson), 16 F.3d 576 (4th Cir. 1994), the costs of prosecution-an
issue in the case-were clearly payable both to and for the government's benefit. See id. at 580.
247. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 40; see also U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg.
& Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that the governmental unit that
collected restitution was not legally obligated to turn those funds over to the victims).
248. 162 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1998).
249. 210 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2000).
250. See Towers, 162 F.3d at 955-56; Rashid,210 F.3d at 207-09.
251. See Towers, 162 F.3d at 953. The fact that the restitution order was entered in a civil, rather
than criminal, proceeding has provided later courts a ground on which to distinguish Towers. See,
e.g., Colton v. Verola (In re Verola), 446 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2006); Thompson, 16 F.3d at
580; Etzel v. American Standard Ins. Co., No. 06-CV-01 19, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60175, at *9
(E.D. Wis. 2006).
252. See Towers, 162 F.3d at 953.
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concluded that restitution is not "for the benefit of' the government when
governmental officials will pass amounts collected in restitution along to the
victims, even in the absence of a mandate to that effect.253 The court in
Towers also dismissed, on the basis of the statute's clear wording, any
argument that the state's benefit need not be pecuniary, but can be found in a
generalized deterrence to fraud:
Some language in Kelly suggests this possibility. But the context in
which "benefit" appears-"payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit"-implies that the "benefit" in question is the
benefit of the money that is "payable to" the governmental unit. In
Kelly the government received and kept the money; not so here.
Citizenry at large may get the benefit of deterrence, but neither the
people of Illinois nor any governmental unit receives a financial
benefit from the restitution that Towers has been directed to
pay ....

254

The case is even stronger if restitution is required to be paid directly to
the disappointed creditor, because in no respect does that constitute
restitution "to and for the benefit" of a governmental unit. Additionally, in
such a case the mandate that was missing in Towers is present-any
restitution that is by chance paid to the governmental unit must be passed
along.
Circumstances such as these, along with the fact that the beneficiaries of
any ordered restitution would be private parties, put a case squarely within
the reasoning of Rashid. In Rashid, the debtor was convicted of criminal
fraud and ordered to pay more than $1.6 million in restitution to his
victims.255 He then filed a Chapter 7 petition and argued that the
restitutionary obligation was dischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 6 The court found the requirement that restitution be
"payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit" was not satisfied.257
Rashid distinguished Kelly on the same grounds noted in Towers-that in
Kelly, "[a] governmental unit kept the restitution and deposited the monies
into the state treasury."258 Restitution flowing to private parties, however, is
neither "payable to" nor "for the benefit of a governmental unit":

253. Id. at 956.
254. Id.
255. See Rashid, 210 F.3d at 203. The restitution order in Rashid, entered pursuant to federal
criminal law, came before § 523(a)(13) was added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994. Considerations
of federalism are not at work when a federal restitution order is at issue-a point that provides
grounds for distinguishing Rashid.
256. See id. at 203.
257. Id. at 207.
258. Id.
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The word "payable" clearly casts an economic light over the
phrase that suggests that the benefit must be conferred from the
monetary value of the debt to be paid by the defendant and not the
more abstract benefit of criminal deterrence.
Similarly, we would pervert the clear, unambiguous language of

§ 523(a)(7) if we found that Rashid's restitution obligation was
"payable to" a governmental unit. Although the record is unclear
whether Rashid's restitution obligations were to be directly paid to
his victims or were to pass through a governmental unit before
reaching the victims, it is clear that the benefit-the money-is
ultimately payable to the victims. 2 59
That Congress clearly meant the conjunctive-requiring that restitution
be paid to and for the benefit of a governmental unit-becomes even more
evident when contrasted with other provisions in the Code in which the
disjunctive is used in this very phrase. When Congress meant the
alternative-"to or for the benefit" of a particular entity-it said so.260 Thus,
§ 523(a)(7) only applies when restitution is payable both to a governmental
unit and for its financial benefit. Neither of those requirements is satisfied
when restitutionary payments flow to private parties.
C.

"Not Compensationfor Actual PecuniaryLoss"

Finally, § 523(a)(7) requires that the obligation at issue be
noncompensatory-that is, that it not carry a debtor-creditor character.261
The legislative history indicates that the subsection was designed to
distinguish obligations that "are penal in nature, as distinct from so-called
'pecuniary loss' penalties which, in the case of taxes,
involve basically the
262
collection of a tax under the label of a 'penalty."'
259. Id. at 208 (citing Towers, 162 F.3d at 955).
260. Section 547, for example, permits the avoidance of preferential transfers made "to or for the
benefit of a creditor." 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006) (emphasis added). This disjunctive means exactly
what it says, as is seen by examination of the infamous "Deprizio" case, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), and the statutory provision added to change its
result, 11 U.S.C. § 550(c). See Margaret Howard, Avoiding Powers and the 1994 Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259, 265 (1995). Similarly, § 547(c)(4) provides for an
exception to avoidance of a preferential transfer made "to or for the benefit of a creditor" when the
creditor later extends new value to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (emphasis added.); cf
§ 550(a)(1) (permitting the recovery of an avoided transfer from "the initial transferee of such
transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.") (emphasis added).
261. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
262. S. REP. No. 95-598, at 79 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865.
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The Court in Kelly did not discuss this statutory element with any
degree of specificity, 263 although it necessarily found the element satisfied.264
It was here that Justice Marshall, dissenting in Kelly, parted company with
the majority. 265 As he reasoned, "[w]ere the restitution order purely penal,
the statute would not connect the amount of restitution to the damage
imposed. Tying the amount of restitution to the amount of actual damage
sustained by the victim strongly suggests that the payment is meant to
compensate the victim." 266
The phrase "actual pecuniary loss" also appears in several other sections
of the Code, with the most relevant of these being § 507(a)(8)(G).2 67 It
provides a priority for "a penalty related to a claim ... in compensation for
actual pecuniary loss."268 The effect of this subsection is to give a tax
liability, collectible under tax law as a penalty, the same priority as the
underlying tax obligation; but a tax penalty that "is punitive in nature and is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss" remains a general unsecured
claim.269 Such a noncompensatory penalty is paid only after full satisfaction
of both timely- and tardily-filed unsecured claims, as provided in
§ 726(a)(4).270 As a result, these claims will be paid only if the estate is
large enough that money would otherwise be left over and returned to the
debtor.
Although § 362(b)(4) does not use so clear a phrase, its application also
depends upon the distinction between collection purposes and the exercise
by a governmental unit of its police or regulatory powers. 2 71 The subsection
provides an exception to the automatic stay for a proceeding that vindicates
a "governmental unit's ... police and regulatory power, including the

263. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986).
Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests in rehabilitation and
punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution
orders imposed in such proceedings . . . are not assessed 'for ... compensation' of the
victim. The sentence following a criminal conviction necessarily considers the penal and
rehabilitative interests of the State. Those interests are sufficient to place restitution
orders within the meaning of section 523(a)(7).
Id.
264. See Pa. Dep't of Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S 552, 558-59 (1990).
265. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 56-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also took issue with
the Court's "serious doubts," id. at 50, as to whether criminal penalties are "debts," id. at 56.
266. Id. at 55.
267. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(G) (2006). The phrase appears in two provisions other than
§ 507(a)(8)(G). First, § 365(b)(1)(B) prohibits the trustee from assuming a contract on which default
has occurred, without compensating the non-debtor for actual pecuniary loss. See id. § 365(b)(1)(B).
Second, § 522(d)(1 1)(D) allows an exemption for payments "on account of personal bodily injury,
not including ... compensation for actual pecuniary loss." Id. § 522(d)( 11)(D).
268. Id. § 507 (a)(8)(G).
269. C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAx ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE § 8:22 (3d ed. 1997).
270. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4).
271. See id. §362(b)(4).
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enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment."27 2 Application of
this subsection depends upon a finding that the government was pursuing its
police or regulatory interests, as opposed to its pecuniary interests.273
Kelly rested on the penal nature of the obligation at issue.274 The
"criminal" or penal nature of that restitution order was the keystone of the
Court's decision, and the holding depended on the Court's view that the
particular restitution obligation at issue in the case vindicated the criminal
interests of the state.275 Kelly leaves ample room for a different outcome
when the statute at issue is not truly penal, but was designed for collection.
Similar distinctions are required when prosecutions under other types of
collection-oriented criminal statutes are at issue. A court must determine
whether the prosecution is penal or pecuniary in nature instead of simply
accepting the "criminal" context as the end of the analysis; an obligation's
penal character is determinative,276 not its label.277
Although restitution may be penal in nature, it does not follow that
restitution is automatically and inherently so. The simple fact is that some
criminal statutes-chief among them bad check statutes, 278 but others as

272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., Missouri v. U.S. Bankr. Court for the E. Dist. of Ark., 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981)
(holding that state grain laws, although regulatory in nature, were designed primarily to protect
pecuniary interests in the debtor's property and, therefore, were not an exercise of police or
regulatory power within § 362(b)(4)); see also In re North, 128 B.R. 592 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991)
(holding suspension of a chiropractor's license was designed to collect state taxes and, therefore, did
not fall within the exception of § 362(b)(4)); 124 Cong. Rec. H 1,089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)
(statement of Rep. Don Edwards that § 362(b)(4) was "intended to be given a narrow
construction ... and not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in
property of the debtor or property of the estate."); cf Ohio v. Kovacs (In re Kovacs), 681 F.2d 454,
456 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding § 362(b)(5) (since repealed and incorporated into § 362(b)(4))
inapplicable to a proceeding "seeking what in essence amounted to a money judgment"), vacated,
459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
274. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986).
275. Id. Other courts similarly recognize that the obligations excepted from discharge under
§ 523(a)(7) are those "essentially penal in nature." Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924,
931 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 51). Reiterating that point, Collins observed that "a
sanction must be penal to be exempt from discharge under § 523(a)(7)." Id. at 932.
276. It cannot be the case that all restitutionary obligations are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7)
without regard to their penal character. If that were true, then § 523(a)(13), which was added in
1998, is completely superfluous. That section makes restitution ordered under federal criminal
statutes nondischargeable. It accomplished nothing if all restitution was already nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(7).
277. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64
F.3d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1995).
278. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis ofOvercriminalization,374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 157, 166 (1967) ("Merchants, of course, are aware of the risk of accepting payment in
checks, but expectedly prefer not to discourage sales. The effect of the insufficient-fund bad-check
laws, therefore, is to enable them to make use of the resources of the criminal law to reduce what, in
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well 2 79-are

often designed, or at least administered, as debt collection

a sense, are voluntarily assumed business risks."); James McCafferty & Gary M. Bubis, Criminal
Restitution and the Bankruptcy Discharge: Should We Reopen Debtors' Prison?, 10 CRIM. JUST. J.
27, 27 (1987) ("The use of 'bad check' criminal prosecutions ... to collect civil obligations has
become commonplace in many jurisdictions."); Kratsch & Young, supra note 144, at 108 ("Use of
state criminal laws to coerce the collection of discharged debts is a nationwide problem. . . . The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found creditor use of the
Tennessee bad check statute to collect discharged debts 'ingrained' in the state's criminal justice
system." (citing Whitaker v. Lockert (In re Whitaker), 16 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(permanently enjoining prosecution for passing bad checks because the criminal statute was used for
collection))); Lare v. Norton (In re Lare), 24 B.R. 959, 962 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that criminal
proceedings, found not to have been instituted in order to collect a debt, are protected under
§ 362(b)(1)).
The distinction between punitive and pecuniary prosecutorial motives distinguishes cases
holding injunctions inappropriate from cases that do not. For example, in Fussell v. Price (In re
Fussell), 928 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1991), the court declined to issue an injunction because the debtor
did not challenge the validity of the criminal statute under which he was charged, id. at 717, and its
collection purpose was, at most, questionably revealed in the statements of prosecutors rather than
on the face of the provision, id. at 714.
The court in Taylor v. Widdowson (In re Taylor), 16 B.R. 323 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981), noted
that bankruptcy courts have an obligation to police against collection abuse:
A Bankruptcy Court must exercise its jurisdiction to determine whether a given criminal
proceeding has been instituted as a method for the collection of a civil debt dischargeable
under the [Bankruptcy] Code. Were bankruptcy courts to permit prosecutions which
have as their ultimate purpose the collection of debts to proceed in state criminal courts
unimpeded and unsupervised, an intolerable distortion of the elaborate machinery of the
bankruptcy laws devised to fix the rights of creditors against the Debtor and the Debtor's
property would be created. In such instances, comity dictates that federal, rather than
state, interests prevail.
Id. at 326.
279. Child support obligations are another example of the criminalization of nonpayment. Kadish,
supra note 278, at 166-67. Obligations for family support are rarely, if ever, dischargeable in
bankruptcy, however, so bankruptcy courts will not be called upon to enjoin a state prosecution for
nonpayment of those debts in order to protect the bankruptcy discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(5)
(2006) (excepting domestic obligations from bankruptcy discharge); 11 U.SC. § 1328(a)(2) (2006)
(also excepting domestic obligations from bankruptcy discharge).
So-called "compromise statutes" provide another example. These statutes permit dismissal
of criminal charges upon proof that the victim has received satisfaction for his or her injuries. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §1378 (West 2009) ("Ifthe person injured appears before the court in which
the action is pending at any time before trial, and acknowledges that he has received satisfaction for
the injury, the court may, in its discretion, on payment of the costs incurred, order all proceedings to
be stayed upon the prosecution, and the defendant to be discharged therefrom.") Discussions of
these statutes often center upon their status as exceptions to the usual rule that victims do not
participate in setting the level of punishment assigned to a wrongdoer. See, e.g., Jeremy D.
Andersen, Victim Offender Settlements, General Deterrence,and Social Welfare, Paper 402, HARV.
JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECON., & Bus. 24-43 (January 2003), http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/402.pdf. Clearly, these statutes provide a convenient way to
satisfy debts and, in fact, are often used to do just that. See, e.g., State v. Johnston, 367 P.2d 891
(Mont. 1962) (noting that local custom allowed a party to escape prosecution upon making
restitution for a debt).
Private prosecutions can also serve a debt-collection purpose if aggrieved creditors who
cannot persuade a prosecutor to pursue an available criminal charge are able instead to pursue the
charge on their own. See, e.g., Comment, Private Prosecution:A Remedy for DistrictAttorneys'
Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 215 (1955). Such prosecutions carry additional risks
beyond debt collection. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that
defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecuting attorney was simultaneously
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devices.280 Statutes that measure the restitutionary award by the victim's
losses (as many, if not most, do) are squarely compensatory, 281 and statutes
that mandate payment to the victim (either directly or through a
governmental unit acting as conduit) betray a collection purpose. 282

representing defendant's wife in a divorce proceeding based on the same alleged assault).
Other examples derive from a different context-namely, whether incarceration for certain
crimes contravenes state constitutional bans on imprisonment for debt. Many of these cases involve
statutes that criminalize simple nonpayment and, for that reason, courts often find them
unconstitutional. These obligations would almost certainly be dischargeable in bankruptcy. See,
e.g., State v. Bartos, 423 P.2d 713, 715 (Ariz. 1967) (holding ordinance permitting imprisonment for
nonpayment of "sewer rental charge" a "debt collecting device under the guise of penal laws" and,
therefore, unconstitutional imprisonment for debt); Turner v. State, 168 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) (invalidating provision in county code making nonpayment of garbage fee a crime
punishable by imprisonment); State v. Madewell, 309 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1973) (holding provision
making it a misdemeanor merely to fail to return an overdue rental vehicle after a seventy-two-hour
demand an unconstitutional imprisonment for debt); Oklahoma ex rel. Moss v. Couch, 841 P.2d
1154 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (holding prosecution for failure to pay wages violated constitutional
provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt); State v. Enloe, 734 P.2d 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding statute criminalizing intentional failure to pay agricultural products unconstitutional
imprisonment for debt).
280. Because these statutes may require fraud on the part of the defendant, they may appear to be
punishing fraud rather than nonpayment. The statutes often presume fraud, however, rendering any
such argument completely specious. See Hennigan,supra note 107, at 119-20 n.166.
In addition, the mere issuance of a bad check hardly seems fraudulent, given research
indicating that a substantial percentage of account holders do not balance their checkbooks. A
survey by Moebs Research Services found that nearly 87% of people do not balance their
checkbooks. Kevin Risner, A Balancing Act, ADVERTISER-TRIBUNE (August 30, 2008), available at
http://www.moebs.com/AboutUs/Moebsinthenews/tabid/57/ctl/Details/mid/484/ItemlD/26/Default.a
spx. Another survey, by the University of Idaho Extension, found that only 48% of teenagers had
even learned how to balance their checkbooks. "Welcome to the Real World," available at
http://www.extension.uidaho.edulimpacts//PdL99/welcome-99.pdf (last visited March 1, 2010).
Similarly, an article in the Memphis Commercial Appeal reported that only 34% of parents had
taught their teenagers how to balance a checkbook and that 54% of college students had overdrawn
their accounts. Don Wade, Teens at a Loss on PersonalFinance, COM. APPEAL, August 18, 2009,
That
available at http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/aug/18/teens-at-loss-on-finance.
means, of course, that more than half of all college students wrote one or more bad checks.
281. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. Even an award that is not primarily
compensatory, however, may include sums intended to reimburse the government for its costs of
prosecution; if such an amount is included, that portion is compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
The court in In re Towers, 162 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1998), for example, distinguished the portion of
the restitutionary award that was intended to reimburse the government's costs of prosecution from
the portion measured by the victims' losses:
Illinois was not a victim of Towers' fraud except to the extent criminal activity induced
the state to expend part of its law-enforcement budget. The bankruptcy judge concluded
that the $50,000 earmarked to reimburse Illinois for the costs of investigation and
prosecution is excluded by this language and therefore dischargeable; the $210,000,
however, is "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
Id. at 955 (internal citation omitted).
282. See Gordon Mehler, CriminalProsecutionand Restitution Under the Bankruptcy Code, 1983
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 817, 818-19.
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Nevada's statutory scheme provides a useful example, because it has
been examined in the case law and because its legislative history is both
available and damning. The Nevada statute presumes that the drawer of a
bad check intended to defraud the holder if that drawer failed to pay the full
amount of the instrument to the holder within the designated period after
receiving notice of the check's return.283 Prosecution is unlikely, however,
because the statute 284 allows the district attorney to establish a restitution
program for a person believed to have violated other provisions.285 If
restitution is paid, no criminal charges are filed and any pending charges are
dropped. Finally, the statute requires any person who either passes three or
more bad checks in ninety days, or one bad check in the amount of $250 or
more to pay restitution regardless of any other penalties imposed upon
conviction.286 Thus, under the Nevada statutory scheme, full restitution is
mandated at every phase and, if it is made promptly, prosecution ceases.
Moreover, this restitution is ultimately paid to the holder of the bad
check, not to the county. The "Bad Check Complaint Form" employed by
the Bad Check Diversion Unit (BCDU) states that the district attorney is the
creditor's "agent to endorse and cash any negotiable instrument tendered by
or on behalf of the drawer of the check." 2 87 According to one court, this
makes the district attorney the "agent of the creditor for collection
purposes."288

It is evident at every step that Nevada's procedures for handling bad
checks were designed only to collect. First, by definition, no crime is
committed, despite the most fraudulent intent imaginable, if the drawer pays
the full amount of the instrument to the holder 289 within the designated
period after receiving notice of the instrument's return.290
Second, the standard first letter sent to debtors, as a matter of first
contact from the prosecutor's office, clearly indicates that criminal charges
283. See Nev. REV. STAT. §§ 205.130, 205.132(1)(b) (2009).
284. See id. §205.466.
285. See id. §§ 205.130, 205.0832, 205.380.
286. Id. § 205.130.
287. Bad Check/Marker Complaint Form, Clark County District Attorney, Bad Check Diversion
Unit, available at http://www.accessclarkcounty.com/depts/districtLattomey/bcu/Documents/BCU
ComplaintEng.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
288. In re Simonini, 282 B.R. 604, 618 (W.D.N.C. 2002), vacated sub nom., Simonini v. Bell (In
re Simonini), 69 F. App'x 169 (4th Cir. 2003).
289. Restitution collected through the diversionary program is payable directly to the creditor and,
if any restitution is collected by the county, it must be turned over to the creditor. See Hearing on
S.B. 68 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 69th Sess. 5 (Nev. Feb. 11, 1997), available at
The
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Library/LegHistory/LHs/1997/SBO68,1997.pdf.
fact that restitutionary payments end up in the pocket of the previously disappointed creditor
implicates two of the statutory elements: the payment is compensatory and, therefore, violates the
statutory requirement that the obligation not be "compensation for actual pecuniary loss"; and the
payment is not "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit," as discussed supra notes 244-60 and
accompanying text.
290. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.132(1)(b).
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are imminent unless the obligation is repaid: "If you wish to avoid having to
appear in court on those charges, you must appear IMMEDIATELY at our
office to pay off all the bad checks we are holding.. . . We will then stop
processing of those charges."29 1
That letter is consistent with the statutory authority that created the
BCDU, requiring that "[flull restitution [be] made to the alleged victim," 292
and with the statute mandating restitution as a penalty upon criminal
conviction.293 Restitution cannot be in an amount less than the debt.294
Restitution measured by the debt strongly signals that the statute is
pecuniary. The Connecticut statute involved in Kelly allowed the offender
to "make restitution, in an amount [he or she] can afford to pay or provide in
a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused" by the offense. 29 5
Restitution that is not measured by the victim's loss is more likely penal in
character than is a restitutionary obligation equivalent to the amount of the
debt.296
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, admissions in the legislative
history reveal that this statutory scheme was designed, from its inception, to
collect debts. The following discussion occurred in hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, held in early 1997, dealing with a provision to
increase the fees charged to individuals who write bad checks:
[Tom]

Pitaro [representing Nevada Attorneys for Criminal

Justice] . . . was told by a bankruptcy attorney that certain casinos

will not go to bankruptcy court because they let the district attorney
collect for them ....

In response to the suggestion the District Attorney's Office was
acting like a collection agency, Mr. Thompson [Assistant District
Attorney for Clark County] declared, "Of course we are!" He stated
people were prosecuted and sent to prison for committing offenses,

291. See, e.g.,In reSimonini,282 B.R. at 617.
292. NEV. REv. STAT. § 205.469(1)(c).
293. See id. § 205.130(1).
294. In re Simonini, 282 B.R. at 620 ("To put it bluntly, the statute appears to be aptly
paraphrased as stating: 'No matter what you do, get this defendant to make full restitution."').
295. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(4) (1985).
296. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64
F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995).
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however, because jails were full they do not want to lock people up
for writing bad checks. They just want victims repaid the money
taken from them. They were willing to not prosecute and dismiss
the case if the money was repaid.297
The same Mr. Thompson, at a later hearing before the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary regarding the same amendment, testified about the
history of the Bad Check Unit:
[T]he Nevada legislature decided it did not want to prosecute and
put into jail individuals who wrote bad checks, what they really
wanted to do was to get them to do the right thing: pay the amount
of money they owed the person they had written the bad check to.
The legislature authorized district attorneys throughout the state
to set up a restitution program, a diversionary program that would
tell someone who had written a bad check, under the threat of
prosecution, that they would be allowed to enter a program to pay
back the person they had written the bad check to. If the amount of
money owed, plus the fee for the service of the Bad Check
Collection Unit collecting it, was paid back, then the individual was
not prosecuted or the case was dismissed if it had already been filed.

David Gibson, Legislative Representative, Clark County Public
Defender's Office,.

.

. stated it was remarkable what kind of

response was received when a District Attorney notified someone
they were going to be prosecuted.298
What is missing here is any concern with the penal interests of the state.
Instead, the focus is on collection and collection only, as a bankruptcy court
in North Carolina found (albeit in quite a different fact pattern). In In re
Byrd,299 the debtor was arrested in North Carolina on an outstanding Nevada
warrant more than a year after entry of discharge in bankruptcy.3 0 The
warrant was based on unpaid checks issued to casinos in Las Vegas.30 1
While the debtor was in jail, his wife collected the amount owed and wired it
297. Hearing on S.B. 68, supra note 289, at 9, 11.
298. Hearing on S.B. 68 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary,69th Sess. 38, 41 (Nev. Apr. 17,
1997), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/ResearchlLibrary/LegHistory/LHs/1997/SB0
68,1997.pdf.
299. 256 B.R. 246 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000).
300. See id. at 248-49.
301. Seeid.at 248.
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to the Clark County District Attorney.302 Nevada then quashed the arrest
warrant, dismissed the case, and paid the money over to the casinos. 303 The
debtor was released from jail and filed a motion to show cause why the
casinos and district attorney had not violated the discharge injunction. 304
The debtor's (unsuccessful) effort to recover funds paid to the state in
order to obtain his release from jail is quite unlike the dischargeability
questions with which this Article is concerned. Nevertheless, Byrd's
relevance is its conclusion that characterization of Nevada's process as
anything other than debt collection is "wholly untenable."30 s The lack of
Nevada's penal interest in these bad check cases is evident from Byrd's
description of the procedures:
The record makes clear that the only "criteria" for acceptance into
the program, which is run not through the Nevada state courts but
rather by the district attorney's office and other law enforcement
agencies or even private contractors of the district attorney's
choosing, was the payment of full restitution to Byrd's former
creditors, through Clark County's trust fund. The court gives no
credence to Clark County's argument that "Byrd voluntarily chose
to enter the deferred prosecution program." The court finds further
that Byrd was automatically admitted into the "program" as a matter
of course, and that payment of the discharged debts and
accompanying fines was the single criteria [sic] for "admittance."
Moreover, the money could come from any source. The fact that
Byrd's spouse was able to come up with the bail amount while her
husband waited in jail serves no rehabilitative purpose whatsoever.
Real rehabilitative measures involve flexibility, thought, and some
personalization dependent not only on what a victim lost, but on
what a particular offender should do to make amends. Requiring
Byrd to pay a certain amount each month, based on his
circumstances, conceivably could serve a rehabilitative purpose;
requiring him to find it immediately or stay in jail, does not., 3 06

302. See id. at 249.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 253. The court also expressed concern about the Clark County officials' "lack of
candor regarding the purposes of its prosecution." Id.
306. Id. (citations omitted); accord Desert Palace, Inc. v. Baumblit (In re Baumblit), 15 F. App'x
30, 36 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that referral to Nevada's Bad Check Unit violated the automatic stay
because it is a collection program).
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The structure and legislative history of Nevada's bad check scheme
reveal that no penal interest is at stake. In that state, and many others with
similar statutes, the focus is entirely on payment.307 Restitution is
mandatory, and it must be in the amount of the debt. Payment prevents
future prosecution, and payment terminates pending prosecution. And when
collection is the story, § 523(a)(7)'s requirement that the obligation not be
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" 30 9 is not met.
D. Kelly and Federalism
The outcome in Kelly seems to have rested not on statutory language,
but primarily on the Court's conception of federalism-its "deep conviction
that federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state
criminal proceedings." 309 Unsurprisingly, the authority cited for this
proposition was Younger.3 10 Only after reviewing the "powerful" interests
states have in administering their criminal justice systems without federal
interference did the Court turn to the statute.
But federalism was not powerful enough to be determinative in the
absence of a statutory section providing for nondischargeability when that
fact pattern came before the Court in Pennsylvania Department of Public
312
The facts were quite similar to those in Kelly-a
Welfare v. Davenport.
conviction for welfare fraud, followed by an order of restitution imposed as
a condition of probation. 313 The Davenports, however, filed their petition
under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7,314 rendering § 523(a)(7)

307. In In re Whitaker, 16 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982), the court issued an injunction
against a prosecutor under § 524(a) because the proceeding was entirely payment-oriented:
The court is especially concerned about the ultimate goals of this criminal prosecution.
It is a matter of common knowledge that creditors in Tennessee frequently resort to the
threat of a criminal prosecution to compel the payment of a civil debt. In many, if not
most instances, criminal prosecutions brought under the bad check and similar statutes
are ultimately resolved by the criminal charges being withdrawn in return for the
payment of restitution and costs by the defendant. This is so engrained in the criminal
system of this state that the creditor Martin referred to his practice of dealing with bad
checks as "turn[ing] them into the Sessions Courtfor collection. "
... The district attorney's offer "to nolle the criminal case upon restitution and cost"
indicates that the motivation of this prosecution was not punishment but the recovery of a
discharged debt. In such a case, the issuance of an injunction is required in order to
effectuate the judgment of the bankruptcy court.
Id. at 922 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court's citation for the last-quoted proposition was
Younger. Id.
308. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(7) (2006).
309. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 50.
312. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
313. Id. at 555-56.
314. Id. at 563-64.
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inapplicable. 31 5 The Supreme Court's opinion focused in part on whether a
restitution obligation is a "debt"'3 16 -a question on which Kelly had
professed "serious doubts."' 17 But the second major element in Davenport
was federalism, and the Court came to the oft-overlooked conclusion3 ,8 that
federalism was not weighty enough to override the Bankruptcy Code's
discharge provisions:
Nor do we conclude lightly that Congress intended to interfere
with States' administration of their criminal justice systems.
Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). As the Court stated in
Kelly, permitting discharge of criminal restitution obligations may
hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in fashioning
appropriate sentences and require state prosecutors to participate in
federal bankruptcy proceedings to safeguard state interests.
Certainly the legitimate state interest in avoiding such intrusions is
not lessened simply because the offender files under Chapter 13
rather than Chapter 7. Nonetheless, the concerns animating
Younger cannot justify rewriting the Code to avoid federal
intrusion. Where, as here, congressional intent is clear, our sole
function is to enforce the statute according to its terms. 319
Under the authority of Davenport, federalism concerns clearly do not
prohibit a bankruptcy court from "interfering" with a state's criminal
proceedings in order to give effect to bankruptcy's discharge provisions.320
315. At the time, § 1328(a) provided for the discharge of all prepetition debts upon completion of
the plan; neither of the two exceptions was applicable. Congress added § 1328(a)(3), which
legislatively overruled Davenport, in 1990. See Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-581, § 3(3), 104 Stat. 2865 (codified as amended at II U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1990)); see also
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, § 3103(3), 104 Stat. 4789, 4944-45 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1990)) (further amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. 103-394, § 302, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (codified at I I U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (1994))).
316. Davenport,495 U.S. at 557-58.
317. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986).
In light of the established state of the law-that bankruptcy courts could not discharge
criminal judgments-we have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make
criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of [§ 101(5)]. But we need not address
that question in this case, because we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any
condition a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence.
Id.
318. Perhaps Davenport is overlooked because its result was overruled legislatively when
Congress added § 1328(a)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code. The amendment did not overrule the Court's
assessment of the relationship between the Bankruptcy Code and general principles of federalism,
however.
319. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (citation omitted).
320. The Davenport dissent put the issue in just those terms, finding notable that "absent from the
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Implicit therein is the conclusion that bankruptcy courts can issue
injunctions designed to protect that very discharge.32 1 If the Court had so
understood in Younger, perhaps it would have placed the emphasis where it
properly belonged---on the statutory language itself-rather than assuming
state interests so powerful that even two federal statutes and the United
States Constitution could not overcome them.

V.

GENERAL BANKRUPTCY POLICIES

The bankruptcy system is grounded in two essential policies. One is the
"fresh start," which recognizes that, for both humanitarian and societal
reasons, individuals should be permitted to start over economically. 322 The
fresh start is effectuated primarily through discharge. Discharge is available
only to the "honest but unfortunate" debtor,3 23 and the Bankruptcy Code's
own provisions separate the deserving from the undeserving. The discharge
exceptions of § 523(a) carry most of this duty and courts should measure a
debtor's entitlement by an objective, language-based interpretation.
The other fundamental bankruptcy policy is equality-that is, the
principle that similar creditors should be treated alike. 324 This equality
principle replaces the state law "race of diligence" under which certain
creditors might recover in full while others are left with little or nothing. 32 5
Although the "fresh start" reflects the respects in which bankruptcy affects
the interests of creditors vis-d-vis the debtor, the equality principle regulates
creditors inter se.
Code's definition (and from the legislative history) of both 'debt' and 'claim' is any indication that
Congress intended the discharge provisions to extend into the criminal sphere." Id. at 566
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also disagreed with the majority on federalism grounds:
I do not believe that Congress so cavalierly would have disregarded the States'
overwhelmingly important interest in administering their criminal justice systems free
from the interference of a federal bankruptcy judge. Every State and the District of
Columbia presently authorize the use of restitution orders. A bankruptcy court discharge
of a criminal restitution order is a deep intrusion by the federal courts into the State's
sovereign power. It vacates a criminal sentence that has presumably been entered in full
accord with all substantive and procedural mandates of the Constitution. I seriously
doubt that "Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options available
to state criminal judges."
Id. at 572-73 (citation omitted) (quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 49). Of course, the fact that an injunction
is possible does not carry the necessary implication that it was authorized or ordered lightly.
321. Such a conclusion follows from the well-understood proposition that a court has the inherent
power to make its orders effective. Cf Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) ("There
can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders
through civil contempt.").
322. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 2009).
323. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
324. TABB, supra note 322, § 1.1, at 3 ("Liquidation bankruptcy cases serve two independent
purposes: relief of debtors, and equitable treatment of creditors."); see also id. § 7.7, at 674 (noting
that "[t]he equality principle is only a touchstone, however, rather than a universally applicable rule"
because of the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme).
325. Id. § 1.1, at 4.
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When a collection scheme is clothed in criminal garb, the favored
creditor has an opportunity to make itself whole while the debtor's other
unsecured creditors must be satisfied with their pro rata portion of the
debtor's non-exempt assets. In that respect, favored creditors obtain an
unfair bankruptcy advantage with the assistance of the state. The
Bankruptcy Code undoubtedly has many provisions that treat certain
creditors specially, thereby reflecting numerous congressional judgments
that certain creditors are deserving of particular protection in the context of
their mutual debtor's bankruptcy. It is also true that Congress has chosen to
favor many creditors who have rights under restitutionary judgments, even
when those judgments have risen out of collection-oriented criminal
proceedings. But it is the Bankruptcy Code that is determinative, not a state
legislature's willingness to criminalize the nonpayment of debt or otherwise
make the state's criminal processes available to disappointed creditors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Anti-Injunction Act prevents a federal court from enjoining a state
criminal proceeding in the absence of an exception. That construction
prescribes that an injunction is permissible when an exception, such as
bankruptcy, is involved. The Supreme Court's decision in Younger v.
Harris,however, constitutes a judicially-created bar to the application of the
Anti-Injunction Act according to its terms. That is arguably objectionable in
any context, although a defense can be mounted in the civil rights context
out of which Younger arose-namely, that § 1983 is so general a statute,
although also an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, that some standard is
needed by which to measure the appropriateness of an injunction in a
particular case. But bankruptcy is different, because the Code provides
ample boundaries to protect legitimate interests of the states, to the extent
that those interests are not oriented toward the collection of debts. Thus, the
Bankruptcy Code should provide the standard for determining whether an
injunction is appropriate.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, state criminal proceedings are not subject
to the otherwise-ubiquitous automatic stay. That exception, however, does
not insulate a state proceeding from an injunction under either § 105 or
§ 524. An injunction can issue under either of those sections in order to
protect a debtor's right to discharge.
The question, therefore, becomes whether a restitution obligation,
imposed by a state court in a criminal proceeding is dischargeable. The
answer to that question is currently mixed, given that Bankruptcy Code
provisions explicitly bar the discharge of such debts in Chapters 11 and 13.
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In Chapter 7, most courts similarly find such debts nondischargeable under
the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Robinson. That decision, however,
was misdirected by an erroneous understanding of the scope of Younger and
a misinterpretation of the relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Even if Kelly were convincingly shown to be wrongheaded, leading
future courts to permit the discharge in Chapter 7 of restitution obligations,
one need only look to recent history to safely predict that Congress might
respond by clarifying the Bankruptcy Code to resurrect Kelly's result. That
is, after all, exactly what Congress did in the wake of Davenport. Be that as
it may; at least the right body would be making the policy decision. And
Younger would be properly laid to rest, at least in the bankruptcy world.
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